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Articles 
THEPOLITICALBAITLEFOR THE 
CONSTITUTION* 
H. W. Perry, Jr.** 
L.A. Powe, Jr.*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Battles over the meaning of the Constitution began before 
the document was written, and they have continued through his-
tory at varying levels of intensity and salience. But an important 
change regarding constitutional battles has gone largely unno-
ticed. Understanding the new terms of engagement helps us bet-
ter explain the current behavior of many political actors, includ-
ing Justices. We also believe that it may have significant 
implications for the future. 
Over the past two generations, the Democratic Party and 
Republican Party have come to fundamentally different concep-
tions of the United States Constitution, and are visions that dif-
fer from the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Previously, albeit only periodically, one political party has had 
serious disagreements with the Court, causing that party to ar-
ticulate a separate constitutional vision.1 What is new is that now 
both parties have done so. Without much recognition, we have 
reached a point where, in addition to the Constitution espoused 
by the Supreme Court, we have two quite different constitutions 
in waiting and in action, one attached to each political party. 
* An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., August 29, 2002. 
** Associate Professor of Law; Associate Professor of Government, The Univer-
sity of Texas. 
*** Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas. 
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Furthermore, unlike previous one-party episodes, this time the 
phenomenon has not evaporated after a few years. Documenting 
and understanding this phenomenon fully requires serious atten-
tion to both law and politics. 
That the political parties have developed opposing visions 
of the Constitution which in turn differ from the Supreme 
Court's demonstrates that there can be useful constitutional in-
terpretation distinct from that of the Court.2 The debates of the 
first Congresses showed as much.3 More importantly, the rise 
and persistence of these opposing visions has important implica-
tions for constitutional politics now and in the future. The fact 
that each party's vision is quite opposed to the other's throws 
light on the apocalyptic statements by each party over the past 
five of six presidential elections4 concerning the inherent danger 
of any Supreme Court appointee coming from the other party. 
The exception was the election of 2004. Neither party's conven-
tion nor campaign reflected the constitutional differences we 
shall describe. The reason was articulated in early September by 
New York Times reporter Roger Cohen when he wrote that 
"this vote has a theme: the war."5 Quite understandably, war6 
and national security trumped everything else. That said, it did 
not take long after the election for the appointment of judges to 
return front and center. Talk did turn to "nuclear options" but it 
2. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); KEITH 
E. WHITIINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); Keith E. Whittington, 
Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning, 
33 POLITY 365 (2001) 
3. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD 1789-1801 (1997). 
4. "The composition of the Supreme Court is a hot issue in the presidential cam-
paign, with both parties warning of evil days if the other side gets to name the next sev-
eral Justices." Eugene Volokh, Where the Justices Are Unpredictable, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2000, at A27. The predictions began with Walter Mondale's statement that if the 
Court "is replaced by Mr. Reagan, it could well be that our great cause of justice will be 
doomed for the lifetime of everyone in this room." Linda Greenhouse, Taking the Su-
preme Court's Pulse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1984, at AS. The reason for the focus on the 
Court during the Reagan-Mondale campaign was that the Justices were just flat-out old, 
with a majority having been born in the Roosevelt administration-Teddy's. See L.A. 
Powe, Jr., Go Geezers Go, 25 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1227, 1234 n.17 (2000). In the 
2000 campaign AI Gore stated that the Court was "at stake: ... Think about civil rights. 
Think about women's rights. Think about human rights. Think about antitrust law. Think 
about Federalism. All of these issue are on the ballot this Nov. 7." Shaila K. Dewan, The 
Campaign: The Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at A14. Initially we thought the state-
ment was just campaign rhetoric, but events proved Gore a wise and prescient candidate. 
The election of the president did, indeed, turn on the Supreme Court and federalism. 
5. Roger Cohen, A Global War: Many Fronts, Little Unity, N.Y. TIMES, "Week in 
Review," Sept. 5, 2004, at Dl. 
6. The war on terror, the Iraqi War, plus, amazingly, the Vietnam War. 
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was not about war. The issue of the appointment of judges was 
so contentious that Republicans threatened to use the "nuclear 
option" and prevent filibusters. Thus far, it has gone unused. In 
the end, the division helps explain the non-ideolofical nature of 
all of the post-Bork nominees except Thomas. Absent pro-
foundly differing constitutional visions, the current battles over 
circuit court nominations might appear merely as tit-for-tat for 
what Republicans did to Clinton nominees. 
Understanding the split not only helps to e~lain and pre-
dict behavior, but it also raises larger questions. For example, 
the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty is sometimes dis-
missed by the claim that the majority position will soon prevail.9 
If, however, the Court develops its own vision of the Constitu-
tion that is different from either party, it raises interesting issues 
about democratic accountability. Perhaps, however, in a political 
world where the parties have become more polarized, the Court 
in forging a majority opinion is offering the bipartisanship that 
the public purportedly wants but is otherwise lacking in Wash-
ington. For many reasons then-historical, behavioral, and theo-
retical- attention to this phenomenon is important. 
Focusing on political parties is not something legal academ-
ics tend to do. 10 We know parties exist and differ on policy, and 
we understand them as electoral organizations, but we often ig-
nore them as crucial institutions in governing. 11 When it comes 
to constitutional analysis, they fall off the radar screen. Legal 
academics are not alone. Supreme Court opinions that describe 
how our government works likewise ignore political parties. Jus-
tices opine about the balance of power between branches, or 
7. A possible caveat is necessary with the fleeting nomination of Douglas Gins-
burg, who was certainly conservative. But wit~ his pot-smoking and wife maintaining her 
maiden name, he did not look like the true believer. The sentence in text was written be-
fore the nomination of Samuel Ali to. 
8. It sheds an interesting light on Mark Tushnet's imaginative proposal in TAKING 
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
9. See Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). But see Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme 
Court and National Policy-Making, 70 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976). 
10. Of course there are notable exceptions such as Bruce Ackerman and Larry 
Kramer. And things are beginning to change. A symposium at Columbia Law School on 
the role of political parties resulted in an entire issue being devoted to the topic. See 100 
COLUM. L. REV. (2000). 
II. Political scientists often differentiate among aspects of the party. They refer to 
"party-in-the-electorate," "party-in-government", and "party-as-organization." When political 
scientists refer to "pigs and "pies" they are usually not referring to nursery rhymes. See JOHN 
ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
IN AMERICA (1995). 
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how the administrative state functions, with hardly a reference to 
the role of political parties. 12 Interbranch struggles and issues of 
separation of powers today are often not the same as those de-
scribed in the Federalist Papers, when parties did not exist. 13 
What usually matters most today is whether we have divided 
government, how divided it is, and how it is divided. Ignoring the 
role of political parties when analyzing a governing arrangement 
would be unthinkable to any serious modern student of govern-
ment. 
Political scientists view political parties as central to govern-
ance.14 The modern American state-indeed any modern de-
mocracy-cannot begin to be understood or explained without a 
deep understanding of the role played by political parties. Par-
ties are the primary institutions that articulate, aggregate, and 
integrate interests in democratic polities. Moreover, understand-
ing the positions of parties is the only way to understand the 
"output" of government. As Morris Fiorina has noted, "the only 
way collective responsibility has ever existed, and can exist, 
given our institutions, is through the agency of the political 
party; in American politics, responsibility requires cohesive par-
ties. "15 Yet political scientists, like legal academics, have not 
noted the creation of a constitutional vision within each party.16 
We proceed by describing the evolution of the parties' con-
stitutional positions and then compare them to the position of 
the Court. We cannot recount every jot, tittle, and perturbation, 
and we often skip over several years. What matters is that at the 
12. Redistricting cases require attention to parties, but even those opinions often 
seem to belie an understanding of how things actually work. 
13. Justices often cite THE FEDERALIST PAPERS or convention debates as their 
guide. Insightful as Publius was, his description of how things would or should work did 
not include a role for political parties. Most of the Founders abhorred the idea of politi-
cal parties; nevertheless, they quickly developed. As such, undue reliance on Federalist 
Papers and convention debates in light of the subsequent development of political parties 
is ironically ahistorical. See L.A. Powe, Jr. & H.W. Perry, Political Parties and Separation 
of Powers presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, Washington, D.C., September 1, 2005. 
14. According to E.E. Schattschneider, "political parties created democracy, 
and ... democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties." ALDRICH, supra note 11, at 3 
(quoting Schattschneider). 
15. Id. 
16. They do, however, talk about parties and the Court and the Constitution. See, 
e.g., KEVIN MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE 
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE WAY TO BROWN (2003); Howard Gillman, How Political Par-
ties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 
1875-1891, AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002) 
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end of our story, the parties have strikingly differing constitu-
tional visions that have persisted and seem likely to persist. 
Parties, of course, are complex institutions. Obviously not 
each member of each party subscribes to every point that we 
shall make. But the positions ascribed to each party faithfully 
track the dominant national presidential wing of each party. We 
have developed these party visions by systematically examining 
the presidential platforms of the parties and statements by party 
leaders in publications such as Congressional Quarterly and the 
Congressional Almanac. We have also supplemented this more 
systematic examination with statements and articles in other ma-
jor press venues. While the presidential wings are generally more 
ideologically "extreme," they are not as different from the 
broader parties as they once were. Political scientists have dem-
onstrated that both parties are becoming more cohesive, more 
partisan, more polarized, and moving toward the ideological ex-
tremes. This is certainly true of the parties in Congress, 17 but 
there is some debate about whether it is also true of partisan 
identifiers in the public. 18 We also believe that the positions that 
we ascribe to the parties will ring true to the reader. 
To set the stage for a discussion of political parties, the Con-
stitution, and the Court, and to set the baseline for our story, we 
begin by retreading familiar ground. We recount two instances in 
which one party agreed with the Court and the other did not. 
17. On "party votes" (a majority of one party opposed a majority of the opposing 
party), "party cohesion" (percentage of members of a party voting with a majority of 
their own party) was 82.0% for Democrats and 86.5% for Republicans in the House dur-
ing Clinton's first term. SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD & HANES WALTON, JR., POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 329 (2d ed. 2000). It continued between 80-90%. Party 
scores in the Senate have been similar. Another score of party unity is Presidential sup-
port scores. During the Clinton administration, support of Clinton by Democrats was 
quite high as was opposition by Republicans. See THE PARTIES RESPOND: CHANGES IN 
AMERICAN PARITES AND CAMPAIGNS 472 (L. SANDY MAISEL 3d ed. 1998). The trend 
has continued and become more dramatic during the Bush Administration. For the 108th 
Congress, House Republicans had a party unity score of 93.6 and House Democrats a 
score of 90.8. Senate Republicans matched their House counterparts with a party unity 
score of 93.6. Senate Democrats had a score of 89. Sean M. Thieriault Party Polarization 
in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement and Member Adaptation, PARTY POLITICS 
(forthcoming); see also JON BOND AND RICHARD FLEISHER, POLARIZED POLITICS: 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (2000). 
18. MORRIS FIORINA, CuLTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF POLARIZED AMERICA 
(2005). 
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II. PRELUDE: SLAVERY AND THE DEPRESSION-
ACKERMAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS 
The rise of the modem mass political party is generally seen 
as beginning with Andrew Jackson and the efforts of Martin Van 
Buren in seeking the formation of a national Democratic Party. 
Our story, however, can begin after the emergence of two na-
tional, competitive parties, the Whigs and the Democrats. Of 
course, the crucial issue driving the parties and the polity was 
slavery. 
Although the Constitution seemingly left slavery to the 
states, the Mexican War and territorial acquisition moved slav-
ery to the top of the national agenda. The debate over slavery 
split both national parties on sectional lines, doomed the Whigs, 
and paved the way for an antislavery candidate to take the 
presidency in 1860 with just 40 ~ercent of the popular vote and 
no southern support whatsoever. 9 
With slavery in the territories ripping both parties apart, it is 
no wonder that politicians in the 1850s labored so hard to depoli-
ticize the issue by framing it as one of "law" for the Supreme 
Court.20 Unlike the Democrats and Whigs, who understood that 
slavery in the territories was too hot to handle, the Supreme 
Court acce~ted the invitation to "finally" settle the issue with 
Dred Scott. 1 Obviously, that didn't work. The Whigs were no 
longer viable, and the newly formed Republican Party believed 
that slavery was a blot on the nation that should be placed on its 
way to an eventual extinction. Given the very limited powers of 
the national government to deal with slavery, the only way that 
essential ending was likely to occur was by a policy of contain-
ment- the very solution that Dred Scott barred. 
The Republicans could not live in a world where Dred Scott 
was law because a constitutional amendment to ban slavery in 
the territories (or to give Congress that power) was a mathe-
matical and political impossibility.22 Halting the spread of slavery 
19. "The territorial question sectionalized American politics and resulted in the 
election of a sectional president." MICHAEL A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND TilE 
AMERICAN WEST 256 (1997). 
20. "From the statues of 1850 and 1854, it was evident that Congress would wel-
come a chance to rid itself of the vexing territorial issue. In fact, Congress had done all it 
could to foster a judicial resolution of the problem." DAVID M. PoTTER, THE 
IMPENDING CRISIS 271 (1976). 
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
22. With over one-third of the states being slave states, gaining the three-quarters 
Article V demands was unthinkable. It might have been easier to gain the three-quarters 
for the Crittendon Amendments protecting slavery where it existed, compensating own-
2004] POLITICAL BATTLE FOR CONSTITUTION 647 
was a moral, not a partisan, position. That goal had created the 
party in the wake of the Whigs' demise, and it was the only 
common ground the purely northern Republicans shared. So 
they developed instead an alternative constitution, one in which 
Congress had the power to legislate on slavery in the territories. 
What to do about Dred Scott? The case held that one black 
man remained a slave, but the rest of the opinion was dicta and 
any Justice appointed by a Republican president would be sworn 
to repudiate that dicta. As Abraham Lincoln, hardly the most 
hawkish Republican, stated immediately before his debates with 
Stephen Douglas, "somebody has to reverse that decision since it 
is made, and we mean to reverse it, and we mean to do it peace-
ably."23 Would he vote to bar slavery in a new territory? Of 
course: "all that I am doing is refusing to obey [Dred Scott] as a 
political rule. "24 Each member of a coordinate branch of the 
government, he observed, is "sworn to uphold the Constitu-
tion- that each member had sworn to support the Constitution 
as he understood it."25 
Lincoln and Republicans generally understood the Consti-
tution to give Congress the power to ban slavery in the territo-
ries as the best option to continue what they held to be the 
Framers' intent to extinguish slavery over time. When they ac-
quired power in the 1860 election, they passed just such a law.26 
Over the next seven years, they took whatever steps necessary-
from war, to barring the South from taking seats in Congress, to 
military reconstruction, to impeachment of the President, to 
stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to rule on the consti-
tutionality of military reconstruction, to forcing the South to rat-
ify the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition for readmission to 
the "indestructible Union of indestructible States"27 -to imple-
ment that vision. While the Democrats throughout retained their 
vision of the Constitution in accordance with that of the Court, 
the Reconstruction Amendments and the election of Grant ren-
dered that view (temporarily) moot. 
ers of runaway slaves, and extending the Missouri Compromise line. They, along with the 
three-fifths clause, were to be forever unamendable. 
23. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 451 (Library of 
America 1989) (July 10, 1858, at Chicago). 
24. /d. at 450. 
25. /d. at 452. 
26. 12 Stat. 432 (1862). The Congress elected in November 1860 would be not 
scheduled to meet until December 1861 and came into special session July 4, 1861 with-
out Southerners. 
27. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,725 (1868). 
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Seventy years later, faced with economic collapse, the De-
mocrats created a new constitution for an activist national gov-
ernment. Their constitution, once accepted, has lasted to the 
present. When Franklin Roosevelt suggested in his first inaugu-
ral that he might be required to assume powers normally exer-
cised only in wartime,28 he must have sensed that constitutional 
problems would be lurking. By the time of the Gold Clause 
Cases/9 he could be sure because he was prepared to announce 
that the government would not comply with the decision30-a 
national discussion rendered unnecessary by the Supreme 
Court's surprising decision to withhold the claimant's desired 
remedy.31 In New Deal circles a vastly more expansive notion of 
federal powers- even broader than that held by the three liberal 
Justices-emerged as the Court and the New Deal government 
waged war over the scope of federal power to cope with the De-
pression. 
The Court-packing plan and Owen Roberts's switch set the 
stage for the New Deal's victory.32 New Deal Justices Hugo L. 
Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, 
Frank Murphy, Robert H. Jackson, and Wiley Rutledge sealed 
that victory and guaranteed the ensuing revolution.33 No longer 
was the power to regulate the national economy a constitutional 
issue. The New Deal Constitution and the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of it merged. The Republicans silently acquiesed. 
The aftermath of the Civil War and the New Deal's Court 
battles are, of course, Bruce Ackerman's prime "constitutional 
moments" after the founding itself.34 One need not agree with 
Ackerman's project to recognize that the Democrats in the 1860s 
28. "But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, 
and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, we shall not evade the clear 
course of duty that will then confront me. We shall ask the Congress for the one remain-
ing instrument to meet the crisis-broad Executive power to wage a war against the 
emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by 
a foreign foe." JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 164 
(1956). 
29. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 
294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
30. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 87-88 
(1995). 
31. Although the Court voted 8-1 that retroactively abandoning the promise to pay 
in gold violated the Constitution, it held ~ that to grant the plaintiffs a remedy would 
unjustly enrich them to the tune of $1.69 on the dollar. 
32. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM fEAR 325-37 (1999). 
33. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998). 
34. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
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and the Republicans in the 1930s embraced the older constitu-
tional order that had been articulated by the Supreme Court and 
were repudiated. What we are about to describe is different. It is 
not one of Ackerman's constitutional moments by any means.35 
Nor does it involve an election (or elections) in which the voters 
repudiate the Court. And most important, it does not involve a 
single party differing from the Court. Instead, it is how the Re-
publicans and then the Democrats over the past decades have 
each developed a rather complete constitutional vision that dif-
fers significantly from that of the Court and each other and have 
maintained that vision over time despite contrary decisions by 
the Court. 
Ill. ONE CONSTITUTION: THREE VIEWS 
Invariably, when both parties and the Court split on consti-
tutional interpretation, the Court has found itself between the 
parties. Beginning with the mature Warren Court, there have 
been four issues on which this three-way split exists (or existed 
for at least thirty years): the rights of those accused of crime, the 
ability of government to make race-based decisions, abortion, 
and the relationship between government and religion, espe-
cially prayer in schools. 36 Strikingly, none of the four issues had 
received significant national attention before the Court's key de-
cisions. Indeed, with respect to prayer and abortion, the issues 
had never been debated in Congress as matters of policy, much 
less constitutional law, prior to the Court's decisions. 
All four areas result in substantial part from the retreat 
from the liberalism of the mature Warren Court, the continuing 
leftward movement of the Democratic Party for the quarter-
century after Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory, and the dra-
matic rightward thrust that Ronald Reagan gave the Republican 
Party. Not surprisingly, the parties' positions on all four issues 
were initially politically driven. There is an additional issue that 
splits the parties. That is the role of the Court itself. We begin 
there and then proceed to the four substantive issues. 
35. A different but complementary source making the same point is MARK V. 
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003). 
36. Because we focus on areas where the parties differ both with each other and the 
Court, we will not discuss areas, such as presidential war-making, where the parties 
(may) differ with each other, but where the Court has taken no position. Another reason 
for avoiding presidential powers is that the parties' positions have a decidedly opportun-
istic slant depending on who controls the presidency. As discussed below there may well 
be other areas involving a similar three-way split. 
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A. THE SUPREME COURT: GREAT OR SMALL? 
From its lofty pronouncements in Cooper v. Aaron/7 Powell 
v. McCormack,38 and United States v. Nixon,39 to Casey's40 mus-
ings on the relationship between the Court and "the country's 
understanding of itself as a constitutional republic,"41 the Court 
has periodically pondered its role in the American system of 
government. But each party has a more basic view of the Court, 
which speaks to each of the four issues on which the parties are 
divided. 
It is all but impossible to believe that Franklin Roosevelt 
never inserted the Court, even obliquely, into the 1936 cam-
paign. However urgently he might have wanted to change its rul-
ings, Roosevelt remained silent until he announced the Court-
packing plan three months after his landslide victory. Roosevelt 
had more reason to attack the Court than any other twentieth 
century president, but no major party candidate had discussed 
the Court during a presidential campaign during the century,42 
and he didn't either.43 Barry Goldwater, after wrenching his 
party away from the so-called "me too" Republicans,44 broke 
37. 358 u.s. 1 (1958). 
38. 395 u.s. 486 (1969). 
39. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
40. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality). Casey goes further than Cooper, Powell, or Nixon because the plurality also 
orders the losers to still their voices on the topic of abortion. 
41. ld. at 865. Justice Jackson once opined that the Court was not final because it 
was infallible; it was infallible only because it was final. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 
(1953)(dissent). Now, if O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter are to be believed, the Court is 
infallible-at least in truly big cases-because the country wants it so. 
42. Although Progressives in both parties were hostile to judicial review and the 
Supreme Court in the first quarter of the century, Robert LaFollette's third-party effort 
in 1924 was the first to attack the Court during an election campaign. By 1922 he had al-
ready claimed in a published article that the "Supreme Court Rules the Nation." 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 314 n.67 
(2000). His Progressive Party's platform called for both direct election of federal judges 
and a grant of power to Congress to overturn Supreme Court decisions. KENNETH 
CAMPBELL MACKAY, PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 11, 144 (1947). An even stronger 
statement comes in 1912 from Eugene Debs's Socialist Party Platform calling judicial 
review of federal legislation a "usurpation" and demanding its abolition so that a federal 
statute could only be repealed by Congress itself or a national referendum of the people. 
3 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2202--{)3 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr. & Fred L. Israel, eds., 1971 ). 
43. Nor did his cabinet. "[P]ublication of Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace's 
systemic critique of the Court was delayed." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 150. Stephen-
son aptly notes that direct attacks on the Court would have played into the Republican 
argument that FDR was an aspiring dictator. !d. at 150-51. But see KEVIN McMAHON, 
RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE WAY TO 
BROWN (2003) (discussing FOR's strategy contemplating the use of law). 
44. The wing now called the Rockefeller (or country club) Republicans. 
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that tradition in his suicidal campaign against Lyndon Johnson, 
the New Deal, and the liberalism of the 1960s.45 That liberalism 
was coalescing around the view that a Great Society needs a 
Great Supreme Court46 and that the United States already had 
one headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
With the Warren Court as its ideal, Democratic liberals 
came to a constitutional vision totally opposed to their Progres-
sive roots and the Democratic Party's previous positions. The 
United States needs a big Court, one willing to stand up to both 
Congress and the states in defense of newly created rights. With 
Brown,47 Enge/,48 Gideon,49 Rernolds,50 and the dismantling of 
the domestic-security program5 as models, Democrats not only 
abandoned their prior fears of conservative or reactionary 
Courts; they embraced an activist judiciary capable of protecting 
and enlarging individual rights that even liberal legislatures 
might hesitate to protect. 
Roe v. Wade52 sealed the deal. Moreover, it showed the po-
litical wisdom of the four liberals on the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee in opposing Richard Nixon's nomination of the incompe-
tent segregationist, G. Harrold Carswell, to the Court, (in part) 
because he was "insensitive to human rights"53 and might prove 
"timorous in the responsibility he has to knock down a law 
which Congress may pass" that violates the Constitution. 54 Harry 
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and later David Souter were neither 
insensitive nor timorous and accordingly were able to gravitate 
toward the ideal of a Great Court. Therefore, despite Republi-
45. In two books, THE POLmCS OF RAGE (1995) and FROM GEORGE WALLACE 
TO NEWT GINGRICH (1996) and a two-part PBS American Experience program, Setting 
the Woods on Fire, Dan T. Carter has persuasively portrayed George Wallace as the pre-
cursor to the Republican Party of the past two decades. We dissent with trepidation from 
such a perceptive historian, but on the point of creating and articulating an alternative 
constitution, Goldwater was first. Wallace added race as an essential theme, but he came 
later. 
46. Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Constitutional Law, 79 TEX. L. REV. 163, 187 
(2000). 
47. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
48. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
49. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1%3). 
50. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1%4). 
51. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 310-17 
(2000). 
52. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
53. Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, Exec. Rep. 91-14 at 13 (91st Cong. 
2nd Sess. 1970) (individual views of Sen. Birch Bayh, Philip A. Hart, Edward M. Ken-
nedy, and Joseph D. Tydings). 
54. George Harrold Carswell, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary 40 
(91st Cong. 2nd. Sess. 1970) (Sen. Birch Bayh). 
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can dominance of the selection process, whereby a quarter of a 
century passed between the nominations of Thurgood Marshall 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Democrats with their rights-
based universalism55 did not waver on what the Court should be 
doing. 
For Democrats, there was an important division of labor be-
tween the Court and the elected branches in a joint march to-
ward complementary goals.56 The elective branches would take 
the initiative to create and implement necessary legislation (with 
the Court quick to validate their actions). Where the legislative 
process was unsuited to deal with a given problem-such as 
Goldwater's two main targets, criminal procedure and school 
prayer-then the Court would take the lead, while Congress and 
the President would approve its actions.57 "It was simply a mat-
ter of determining which institution was best-suited to handle a 
specific problem. "58 Thus the Court took responsibility for re-
forming criminal justice because it was "the branch of govern-
ment most familiar with the problems and most capable of su-
pervising the solutions."59 
By contrast, Goldwater articulated what would be the Re-
publican Party's position for the rest of the century. Regardless 
of its staffing, the federal judiciary had become too big for its 
own breeches, much less the country's. Thus of all three 
branches of government, "today's Supreme Court is least faithful 
to the constitutional tradition of limited government, and to the 
principle of legitimacy in the exercise of power. "60 
Republicans ran against the Warren Court in both 1964 and 
1968,61 and they wanted a truly diminished role for any future 
Court. Yet Republicans could not find the clean picture of an 
ideal Court that the Democrats possessed because Republicans 
wanted some, but not much, judicial intervention. Nixon's "strict 
55. See JOHN GERRING, PARTY IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 253 (1998). The 1972 
Democratic platform committed the party "to resuming the march toward equality: to 
enforcing the laws supporting court decisions and enacting new legal rights as necessary 
to assure every American true opportunity, to bring about a more equitable distribution 
of power, income and wealth." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1730 (1972). 
56. Because the idea of the Great Court crystallized during the Great Society, the 
operative assumption was that the elected branches would be controlled by the Democ-
rats. 
57. President Kennedy provided the perfect model here with his strong defense of 
Engel. See POWE,supra note 51, at 189. 
58. Id. at 214. 
59. /d. at 494. 
60. 22 CONG. Q. 2534 (1964). 
61. See POWE, supra note 51, at 238,391-92,410,474-75. 
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constructionist" and "judicial restraint" were about as good as 
could be done.62 The Bushes prefer "not legislating from the 
bench. "63 Even as Republicans came to condemn Roe v. Wade, 
they did not wish to adopt the stance of the Progressives and 
claim judicial review was illegitimate. 
The only effort after the Carswell nomination that the Re-
publicans attempted to delegitimize the Court came from Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese. In a 1985 speech to the American 
Bar Association he demanded a jurisprudence of original in-
tent.64 A little over a year later in a speech commemorating the 
Bicentennial of the Constitution, he proclaimed the obvious fact 
that there was a distinction between Supreme Court decisions 
and the Constitution itself, but then offered a controversial at-
tack on Cooper v. Aaron65 that only the text of the Constitution 
represented "the supreme law of the Land."66 Three weeks later, 
Meese recanted, claiming on~ that there was a right to criticize 
the Court and its decisions. Meese's trial balloon had been 
greeted by a cascade68 of anathemas and was virtually unde-
fended (if not indefensible).69 Furthermore, Republicans knew 
62. Nixon promised that his "nominees to the high court ... would be strict con-
structionists who saw their duty as interpreting law not making law." E.W. Kenworthy, 
Nixon, in Texas, Sharpens His Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1968, at 1, 79. It is interesting 
how closely Nixon's language comes to that of liberals in condemning substantive due 
process. For example: "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is 
up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation .... We 
refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weight the wisdom of legislation,' and we emphati-
cally refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike 
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be 
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."' Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,729,731-32 (1963). 
63. Like father: Susan Page, Bush Selects Little-Known Judge, NEWSDAY, July 24, 
1990 at 3, like son: Rick Klein, Miers Speeches Backed Stronger Executive Branch, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2005, at Al. 
64. Edwin Meese, III, The Attorney-General's View on the Supreme Court: Toward 
A Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 701 (1985). 
65. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): ("Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution 
the 'supreme Law of the Land.' In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unani-
mous Court, referring to the Constitution as 'the fundamental and paramount law of the 
nation,' declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that 'It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'"). 
66. Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution (delivered at Tulane University, 
October 21, 1986); Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TULANE L. REV. 
979 (1987). 
67. Edwin Meese, III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 
1986, at A21, reprinted in 61 TULANE L. REv. 1003 (1987). 
68. Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TULANE 
L. REV. 991,991 n.1 (1987) (collecting sources). 
69. Anthony Lewis accused Meese of "making a calculated assault on the idea of 
law in this country." Law or Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23. While finding 
Meese to be like "a stopped clock [that] is right twice a day," Sandy Levinson offered the 
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that some government actions relating to race or restraining the 
(typically Republican) President could slide over the constitu-
tional line, and they wanted a Supreme Court capable of saying 
so (not to mention that such a Court might be necessary to 
"save" the country from the anarchy70 of having a state court or 
legislature or the United States House of Representatives 
choose the nation's President).71 Nevertheless, the very examples 
of "beyond the Beltway" jurists, who seemed less conservative 
on the Court than when nominated,72 caused Republicans to 
worry that the Court itself was, at some fundamental level, un-
trustworthy. 
Republicans often advocated achieving their constitutional 
vision through the Article V process. This has been merely a tac-
tical way of signaling a desired constitutional outcome by an ap-
peal to what appears to be a politically popular outcome. At all 
times the Republicans have believed that the Constitution, 
properly interpreted, yielded their desired outcome. The barrier 
was the Court's erroneous interpretation. The Article V route 
was necessary because it seemed highly unlikely that the Court 
would reverse course in the near future. Essentially Republicans 
demanded constitutional reform only when the offending deci-
sion commanded at least seven Justices. When the results were 
closer, 5-4 and 6-3, the Republicans did not call for an amend-
ment. Instead they looked to normal attrition (two Justices per 
presidential term) to pave the way for the necessary constitu-
tional change. 
Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats have never de-
manded a constitutional amendment to overturn an unfavorable 
Supreme Court opinion. This may have resulted from the De-
mocrats' belief in a Great Supreme Court and the assumption 
that revising a decision by amendment would undermine that be-
lief. Or it may have stemmed from the fact that the Democratic 
sound historical perspective that Meese's speech echoed the views of both Abraham Lin-
coln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Sanford V. Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 
243 THE NATION 689 (1986) reprinted in 61 TULANE L. REV.1071, 1078 (1987). 
70. Paul Gigot, Liberals Discover the Tyranny of the Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 
2000, at A16 ("saved the country from another month of fighting before reaching the 
same result"); Charles Krauthammer, Defenders of the Law, WASH. POST, December 15, 
2000, at A41 (averted "a true constitutional crisis"). 
71. Or saving the country from the trauma of not knowing for about another month 
who the next president would be (something that had always been handled well enough 
in the month prior to any election). 
72. Unlike Scalia and Thomas (as well as Bork and Rehnquist), who were nomi-
nated while working within the District, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter each came to the Court from outside the Beltway. 
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side of contested issues was never sufficiently popular to make a 
constitutional amendment even thinkable. More to the point, the 
Democrats fudged how strongly they supported a given proposi-
tion. As discussed below, strong church-state separation and 
quota-like affirinative action are prime examples. 
With divergent visions of the Court serving as the backdrop, 
we turn to the evolution of the parties' divergent visions of the 
Constitution. 
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
1. Try the Criminal, Not the Police: Goldwater's attack on 
the Court for "contributing to the breakdown of law and order 
in the cities"73 echoed attacks by police chiefs on Mapp74 and 
Escobedo.75 Even former President Eisenhower urged Republi-
can delegates at the 1964 convention "not to be guilty of maudlin 
sympathy for the criminal who, roaming the street with 
switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a prey [sic], sud-
denly becomes upon apprehension a poor, underprivileged per-
son who counts upon the compassion of our society and the 
weakness of many courts to forgive his offense."76 But the Re-
publican attack on the Court was Rremature. Americans did not 
yet perceive crime as a major issue;77 by Miranda, 78 they would.79 
In retrospect, especially after both Nixon and George Wal-
lace expanded Goldwater's critique in the context of rising crime 
rates and annual summer race riots, the "law and order" position 
had come to be seen as being about race. But Goldwater was no 
racist, having opposed the Civil Rights Act on libertarian princi-
ples, and Americans could be genuinely disturbed about the 
decade's rising crime rates. "Law and order was a separable issue 
from race but it was not always a separated issue. "80 Beginning at 
least with Gerald Ford in 1966, Republicans fused race and 
crime for political gain: "How long are we going to abdicate law 
and order-the backbone of civilization-in the form of the soft 
73. POWE, supra note 51, at 391-92. 
74. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1%1}. 
75. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
76. THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, 241-42 (1965). 
77. Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the Supreme 
Court, 32 PUB. OPINION Q. 31, 36 (1968). 
78. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
79. POWE, supra note 51, at 399-400. 
80. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 382 (1983) (emphasis 
in original). 
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social theory that the man who throws a brick through your win-
dow or tosses a fire bomb into your car is simply the misunder-
stood and underprivileged product of a broken home?"81 Even-
tually, we would have Willie Horton ads. 
Fusing race and crime did work politically, but it would be a 
mistake to discount concerns over crime. "The right to be free 
from domestic violence"82 can stand on its own.83 Miranda, after 
all, had been accompanied by stories of confessed murderers go-
ing free 84 and Senator Sam Ervin was not alone in his reaction 
that "enough has been done for those who murder and rape and 
rob!"85 That held true regardless of the race of the criminal. 
Nixon argued that Miranda nearly ruled out confessions as a law 
enforcement tool86 and his punch line during the 1968 campaign 
was that "some of the courts have gone too far in weakening the 
peace forces against the criminal forces." 87 Wallace, of course, 
went further, much further. 88 Their campaigns tapped a growing 
concern over personal safety,89 and they firmly embedded in the 
Republican Constitution the idea that the criminal trial should 
be about the defendant's guilt or innocence, not about police 
(mis)behavior.90 "We must reestablish the principle that men are 
accountable for what they do and that criminals are responsible 
for their crimes."91 When the Court put the death penalty into 
play,92 the Republicans proclaimed their fealty to it.9 
81. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, PoLmCS AND POLICY 286 (1968) (quoting Ford). 
82. John W. Finney, Nixon and Reagan ask War on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
1968, at 1. By domestic violence Nixon did not mean intrafamily violence; he meant vio-
lence by strangers. 
83. Nixon did not always see it that way. After watching a "law and order" com-
mercial he stated, "this hits it right on the nose .... It's all about law and order and the 
damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there." JOE MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE 
PRESIDENT 1968, at 23 (1969). 
84. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 185 (1970). 
85. Nan Robertson, Ervin Protests Curbs on Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1966, at 
54. 
86. POWE, supra note 51, at 410. 
87. 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON 154 (1989). 
88. GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 10 ("If you walk out of this hotel tonight and some-
one knocks you on the head, he'll be out of jail before you're out of the hospital, and on 
Monday morning they'll try the policeman instead of the criminal."). 
89. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 201 ("In the past forty-five minutes this is what 
happened in America. There has [sic] been one murder, two rapes, forty-five major 
crimes of violence, countless robberies and auto thefts."). 
90. See 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 906 (1976)("Emphasis must be on protecting the 
innocent and punishing the guilty."). 
91. 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 988 (1968). 
92. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
93. 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 906 (1976). 
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Crime had become a Republican issue. Republican plat-
forms robustly emphasized the problem of violence in society 
and the need for public safety.94 They were never conflicted on 
whether or how to use the issue. Republicans worked to solve 
the crime problem; Democrats contributed to it. "We have solid 
evidence the war on crime is being won. The American people 
know that once again the thrust of justice in our society will be 
to protect the law-abiding citizenry against the criminals rather 
than absolvin.R the criminal of the consequences of his own des-
perate acts." Even before the Willie Horton ads, the elder 
George Bush sounded as if he were running against the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (in which Michael Dukakis had trum-
peted his membership while seeking the Democratic nomina-
tion).96 However much the Court retreated, first under Burger 
and then under Rehnquist, it was never enough for Republicans. 
The hated Miranda and Mapp decisions had to be overruled, and 
they weren't. Indeed when Miranda's day came, it was reaf-
firmed by Rehnquist with two more positive votes than it origi-
nally garnered.97 
2. The Criminal Justice Process Must Be Scrupulously Fair: 
Democrats applauded the Warren Court's criminal procedure 
decisions.98 No elected branch of government could have taken 
the antiquated criminal justice system and transformed it, espe-
cially against skeptical or hostile public opinion. Like the views 
of Nixon's "law and order," however, the Democrats' views on 
crime were intertwined with race. Just as African-Americans had 
been major beneficiaries of the Warren Court's revolution, so 
too were they disproportionately involved with the criminal jus-
tice system, and Democrats would not consider appearing hos-
tile. Thus the 1968 platform, which firmly established the party's 
positions for at least two decades, stated that the "entire nation 
94. "Republicans will address real problems that face Americans in their neighbor-
hoods day by day-deterioration and urban blight, dangerous streets and violent crime 
that makes millions of Americans ... fearful in their own neighborhood and prisoners in 
their own homes." 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 64B (1980). "Safety and security are vital to 
the health and well-being of people in their neighborhoods and communities." /d. at 66B. 
"Those convicted of serious offenses must be jailed swiftly, surely and long enough to 
ensure public safety." 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 51B (1984). 
95. 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 2160 (1972). 
96. David G. Savage, Strategy Focuses Attention on Liberal Group, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 1988, at 14: "Dukakis' 'entire attitude' on social issues is 'best summed up in 
four little letters: A.C.L.U.,' Bush said." 
97. United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
98. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION 9 (1991). 
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is united in its concern over crime" and then proceeded to treat 
the issue as if it were political poison.99 
Pledging a "vigorous and sustained campaign against law-
lessness in all its forms," 100 the Democrats placed organized 
crime and white collar crime first. Murder, rape, armed robbery, 
and other violent crimes were unmentionable by name. These 
were simply placed last as "other violations of the rights and lib-
erties of others," as if they were incidentals or accidents. 101 In 
subse';louent years the Democrats would decry domestic vio-
lence, 2 violence against "health care providers" and their fe-
male patients/03 and the "unethical and unlawful greed among 
too many of those who have been governing our nation,"104 but 
not until Bill Clinton's candidacy did the Democrats acknowl-
edge forthrifohtly that "crime is a relentless danger to our com-
munities."10 
Because questioning criminality was deemed racist, the 
Democratic response was to ignore the criminal-except to as-
sure everyone that his rights were to be respected and to pledge 
to attack the "root causes" of crime: "in fighting crime we must 
not foster injustice. Lawlessness cannot be ended by curtailing 
the hard-won liberties of all Americans."106 "We can protect all 
people without undermining fundamental liberties by ceasing to 
use law and order as a justification for repression. "107 
By 1972, and especially thereafter, those liberties that had 
been "hard-won" under the Warren Court were being quite suc-
cessfully undermined by the Burger Court.108 The Democrats 
were doubly frozen. They did not believe that hard-won rights 
should be changed, 109 calling for "fairness in every part of the 
criminal justice system." 110 The 1980 platform talked of reform, 
99. 24 CONG Q. ALMANAC 1040 (1968). 
100. !d. 
101. !d. 
102. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1068 (1980). 
103. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 938 (1984). 
104. 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 88A (1988). 
105. 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 62A (1992). 
106. 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1040 (1968). 
107. Id. 
108. Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practices" Phases of the Criminal Process and the 
Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143 (Herman Schwartz ed., 
1987). 
109. In 1976 the Democrats stated that they supported criminal justice reform, "but 
we oppose any legislative effort to introduce repressive and anti-civil libertarian meas-
ures in the guise of reform." 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 863 (1976). 
110. 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1739 (1972). 
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but always with caveats that could have been written by the 
ACLU: "scrupulously protecting fundamentalliberties," 111 "the 
very real concern about protecting civilliberties,"112 "fully pro-
tecting civilliberties."113 Nowhere did a platform show such con-
cerns for protection against violent crime; the 1980 platform, 
quoted above, worried instead about "excessive or illegal police 
force." 114 In what is nice retrospective irony, the Democrats wor-
ried less about violence than how the "unethical and unlawful 
greed among too many of those who have been governing our 
nation, procuring our weapons and polluting our environment 
has made far more difficult the daily work of local policemen, 
teachers and parents who must convey to our children respect 
for justice and authority." 115 The crimes that should concern 
Americans were those that Republicans were prone to commit. 
The 1972 platform was especially interesting. First, it sought 
to blame the rise in crime on the Nixon administration. 116 Then it 
devoted more space to advocating the restoration of the rights of 
ex-felons than to combating street violence.117 In 1980 domestic 
violence received more attention than all other crimes, which 
were unmentioned by name but nevertheless "condemned," but 
then quickly understood as parts of "a life of poverty and de-
spair" which Democrats would attempt to remedy. 118 Four years 
later, the Democrats condemned the Ku Klux Klan and other 
hate groups, but never mentioned violent crime even under the 
sonorous euphemism of "other violations of rights and liber-
ties."119 They were opposed in 1984, however, to the sale of 
"snub-nosed handguns"120 and, four years later, so-called "cop 
killer" bullets.121 
In retrospect, Michael Dukakis's pod-person response in the 
1988 Presidential debate to the hypothetical concerning the rape 
Ill. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1068 (1980). 
112. /d. 
113. /d. at 1088. 
114. /d. at 1098. 
115. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 88A (1988). 
116. Nixon's pledge "to strengthen the 'peace forces' ... has been broken [and] 
[v]iolent crime has increased by one-third ... Effective law enforcement requires tough 
planning and actions. This Administration has given us nothing but tough words ... (and] 
unequal law enforcement." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1739 (1972). 
117. /d. at 1740. 
118. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1058 (1980) 
119. /d. at 948. 
120. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 978 (1984). 
121. 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 88A (1988). 
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and murder of his wife is fully explicable.122 Democrats worried 
about hard-won liberties and the possibility that repression and 
miserly federal spending precluded the alleviation of the root 
causes of crime. Thus while Democrats saw the Willie Horton ad 
as Nixon's "law and order" redux, Republicans saw Horton as 
the symbol of the logical outgrowth of the Democrats' obsessive 
concern with the rights of criminals (and not simply those just 
accused of crime) and the Democrats' lack of concern over crime 
itself. 123 
Bill Clinton did not repeat Dukakis's errors. He returned to 
Arkansas just before the 1992 New Hampshire primary to over-
see the execution of Rickey Ray Rector, an African-American 
cop-killer who gave himself a frontal lobotomy by a gunshot 
wound to the head and thereby reduced himself to the erratic 
comprehension of a young child. 124 For a variety of reasons, not 
the least of which was demographic, violent crime dropped dur-
ing the Clinton era, and crime was not an issue in the 2000 elec-
tion. The problem of mistakes in the capital punishment system 
received full media attention, but it was a press issue, not one in 
which the Democratic ticket showed the slightest interest even 
though the Texas system was an extremely inviting target. 
In giving his support to a constitutional amendment on vic-
tims' rights (in time for the 1996 campaign), Clinton stated that 
he had "learned what every victim of crime knows too well: As 
long as the rights of the accused are protected and the rifhts of 
victims are not, time and again, the victims will lose." 12 After 
the Oklahoma City bombing, Clinton had shown that Democ-
rats, too, could be tough on criminals. He "vigorously sug-
ported"126 the Effective Death Penalty and Antiterrorism Act, 7 
a Republican measure-taken from Newt Gingrich's Contract 
with America-to speed the habeas process and supposedly to 
122. Richard Cohen, A Man in Hiding, Wash. POST, Oct. 16,1988, at C7. 
123. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 98, at 224. 
124. His pistol shot to his head (corning after he had casually shot the police officer) 
took away the front three inches of his brain. Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas: Annals 
of Law and Politics, 69 THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105. Rector left the dessert 
from his last meal uneaten because he always withheld some food for later consumption, 
and he intended to return to finish it. "One of his attorneys had earlier stated that Rector 
'thinks he'll be back in his cell on Saturday morning."' Id. 
125. U.S. Newswire, June 25,1996. 
126. Mark V. Tushnet & Larry Yack!e, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 21 (1997). 
127. 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)). 
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reduce the "thousands upon thousands of frivolous petitions 
[that] clog the federal district court dockets. "128 
Whether Clinton's approach to criminals represents the 
Democratic position after his presidency, we do not know. If it 
does, then the Democrats will have merged their official position 
with that of the Court. If not-and we suspect that it does not-
then the three-way split will continue with many Republicans 
unsatisfied, with some tempted to slip into demagoguery, and 
with the Democrats believing that the criminal justice system is 
unfairly tilted against the defendant. 
C. RACE 
1. The Constitution Is Color-Blind: Abraham Lincoln's party 
believed it had largely completed its work when it joined North-
ern Democrats to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act a year later. Those statutes' strong anti-
discrimination features 129 combined with a formal rejection of 
race-conscious remedies in employment. 130 Despite Goldwater's 
negative vote on the Civil Right Act, Republicans had provided 
the necessary and overwhelming support to break Southern fili-
busters against both bills. Nevertheless, the civil rights move-
ment, these laws, and Goldwater's presidential candidacy would 
place African-Americans squarely within the Democratic 
Party. 131 This, combined with annual summer race riots during 
the 1960s, had immediate consequences for Republicans. Driven 
by politics, not ideology, they came to be perceived as less sup-
portive of civil rights. Thus the 1968 platform almost completely 
ignored race and civil rights, 132 and observers saw Nixon's "law 
and order" campaign as explicitly appealing to white voters and 
therefore implicitly anti-civil rights. 
The move from color-blindness to race-consciousness was 
swift, unexpected, and, initially, not much debated. First, the 
NAACP intentionally and successfully swamped the Equal Em-
128. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 44 {Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., 1994). 
129. As explained by Hubert Humphrey, the floor leader, discrimination was "a dis-
tinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their different race." 110 
CoNG. REC. 5423 {1964). The prohibition on discrimination necessarily barred "prefer-
ential treatment for any particular group." /d. at 11,848. 
130. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 183-84 (1992); HERMAN 
BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 24 {1991); THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS 37 (1983). 
131. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 98, at 35-36. 
132. The sole mention was a boiler-plate statement that the country "must attack the 
root causes of poverty and eradicate racism, hatred and violence." 24 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC 987 (1968). There was no elaboration. 
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ployment Opportunity Commission with Title VII complaints.133 
Case-by-case adjudication of individual cases would take forever 
in a workforce where seniority and jobs were entrenched by past 
union discrimination. Then, with Nixon's approval, Secretary of 
Labor George Shultz established the so-called "Philadelphia 
Plan," which required construction unions in greater Philadel-
phia to set "goals and time tables" for the hiring of African-
Americans for craft union jobs.134 Within a year, the "goals and 
time tables" approach135 was incorporated in regulations govern-
ing all federal contractors with greater than fifty employees.136 A 
year later, in Griggs v. Duke Power,137 the Supreme Court 
stripped employers of their ability to set job qualifications not 
driven by business necessity if the qualifications had an adverse 
disparate impact on minority groups.138 Griggs was a large step 
toward a legal regime in which an employer would have to ex-
plain why the racial ratio of its work force did not match that of 
the geographical area. 
If it seems strange that the Nixon administration rather than 
its predecessor was the one that abandoned colorblind nondis-
crimination (absent a judicial order), it was. Nevertheless, the 
Philadelphia Plan made sense. First, it offered a potential solu-
tion to a huge problem of privilege based on racial discrimina-
tion. More importantly, it pitted what were then two prime De-
mocratic Party constituencies-organized labor and African 
Americans-against each other .139 
At virtually the same time, the Nixon administration tried to 
slow down the escalating desegregation orders coming in the 
133. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 412-14 (1994). 
134. Paul Marcus, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas on Federal Con-
tracts, 17 UCLA L. REV. 817 (1970). 
135. "The rate of minority applicants recruited should approximate or equal the rate 
of minorities to the applicant population in each location." Department of Labor Order 
No.4, as reported in the New York Times, Jan. 16, 1970, at 15. 
136. They were required to establish goals and timetables for "underutilization," 
defined as "having fewer minorities or women in a particular job group than would rea-
sonably be expected by their availability." 41 C.F.R. § 60-4.6(b) (2005). 
137. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
138. I d. at 436 (requiring tests to be "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job per-
formance"). 
139. According to John Erhlichman, Nixon's chief domestic advisor, "Nixon thought 
that Secretary of Labor George Shultz had shown great style in constructing a political 
dilemma for labor union leaders and civil rights group .... Before long, the AFL-CIO 
and the NAACP were locked in combat over one of the passionate issues of the day and 
the Nixon administration was located in the sweet and reasonable middle." EDSALL & 
EDSALL, supra note 98, at 97. 
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wake of Green v. New Kent County. 140 Specifically the admini-
stration opposed busing as a desegregation tool, and Nixon pub-
licly vowed to "hold busing to the minimum required by law." 141 
Then he led an unsuccessful Republican effort to undo legisla-
tively142 the major busing decision, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education. 143 Nixon's stand against bus-
ing was the key aspect of his strategy to move conservative white 
Southern Democrats into their natural ideological home, the 
Republican Party.144 Therefore busing was an issue on which the 
Republicans never varied their stance, only the tone of their 
rhetoric. They certainly liked the phrase "forced busing."145 
The Republicans favored a race-conscious remedy in em-
ployment where past discrimination was by private parties and 
was assumed but not proven. The Republicans then opposed 
what was thought to be the only effective remedy for public 
school desegregation where state laws had previously mandated 
discrimination and federal judges had found continuing effects of 
that specific unconstitutional action. The inconsistency of the 
two positions was ameliorated by how neatly they met the Re-
publicans' political needs. Yet when the Democrats mandated 
quotas for delegates to their 1972 convention, Nixon cynically 
exploited George Wallace's message by turning on his own ad-
ministration's affirmative action employment efforts: "When 
young people apply for jobs ... and find the door closed because 
they don't fit into some numerical quota, despite their ability, 
and they object, I do not think it is ri~ht to condemn those young 
people as insensitive or even racist."1 6 
140. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
141. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 460-61. When Elliot Richardson, Secretary of 
HEW, seemed too supportive of busing decrees, Nixon informed aide John Ehrlichman 
"to jump on Richardson and Justice and tell them to Knock off this Crap. I hold them 
personally accountable to keep their left.wingers in step with my express policy-Do 
what the law requires and not one bit more." !d. (emphasis in original). 
142. See JAMES T. PAITERSON, GRAND EXPECfATIONS 733 (19%). 
143. 401 u.s. 1 (1971). 
144. !d. at 730-31. 
145. See, e.g., 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 907 (1976): "We believe segregated schools 
are morally wrong and unconstitutional. However, we opposed forced busing to achieve 
racial balances in our schools .... If Congress fails to act, we would favor consideration of 
an amendment to the Constitution forbidding the assignment of children to schools on 
the basis of race." 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 63B (1976): "We must halt forced busing and 
get on with the education of all our children." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 2159 (1972): 
:·we are committed to guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity and to complet-
Ing the process of ending de jure school segregation. At the same time, we are irrevocably 
opposed to busing for racial balance." 
146. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 637. 
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With Bradford Reynolds as the head of the civil rights divi-
sion of the Reagan Justice Department, the Republicans en-
shrined their view that "it was impermissible to use policies to 
promote groups that might have suffered past discrimination-
i.e., blacks-arainst the interests of individuals in the present-
i.e., whites. "14 This conclusion took aim at the recent Bakke148 
and Fullilove149 decisions, which held quotas illegal but neverthe-
less sustained significant amounts of affirmative action in higher 
education and government contracting. Reynolds believed that 
the job of government was not to remedy historic patterns of 
discrimination; it was to protect individuals from specific acts of 
discrimination. AlonR with busing, affirmative action was uncon-
stitutional and out. 0 Rernolds's policies, President Reagan 
made clear, were Reagan's. 51 
Reagan also wanted to end the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
when it expired during his first term, but widewread bipartisan 
support forced him to endorse reauthorization.1 The 1982 Act's 
new language on voter dilution, it turned out, offered an irre-
sistible opportunity for "the ultimate political one-night 
stand."153 The Republicans took it. 154 At the urging of strategist 
Lee Atwater, the first Bush Justice Department joined with civil 
rights groups to demand as many safe black legislative districts 
as possible. Affirmative action for black Democratic candidates 
diluted the strength of white Democrats, possibly moved some of 
them into the Republican Party, and offered the opportunity to 
pack Democrats into their own very safe districts. Republicans 
knew that the position was inconsistent with their colorblind ap-
proach to on all other race issues, 155 but the potential political 
147. CARTER, supra note 45, at 56. 
148. Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
149. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
150. "I am, most candidly, offended by all forms of discrimination; I regard govern-
ment tolerance of favoring or disfavoring individuals because of their skin color, sex, re-
ligious affiliation or ethnicity to be fundamentally at odds with this country's civil rights 
policies." William Bradford Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 1986 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1014. 
151. "Mr. Reynolds' civil rights views reflect my own. The policies he pursued are 
the policies of this administration, and they remain our policies as long as I am presi-
dent." Howard Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted Down, WASH. POST, June 28, 1985, 
at Al. 
152. CARTER, supra note 45, at 58. 
153. Jim Sleeper, Rigging the Vote by Race, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1992, at A14 (quot-
ing journalist Peter Brown). 
154. Samuel Issacaroff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. 
CT. REV. 45, 54-55. 
155. "You don't sell your birthright for a few votes" was the comment of William 
Bennett Richard L. Berke, Strategy Divides Top Republicans, N.Y. nMES, May 9, 1991, 
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gains in the legislatures were too appealing for principle to pre-
vail.Is6 
Surprisingly, after pushing so hard for "max-black" districts, 
the Republicans reversed themselves and reverted to arguing for 
race neutrality in their amicus brief in Shaw v. Reno. 151 The rea-
son for the return to form is not clear. Perhaps it was Atwater's 
early death. Perhaps it was the unknown of the Clinton admini-
stration's civil rights division. Perhaps it was because the "max-
black" policy did not yield the expected Republican congres-
sional gains in the 1992 elections. For whatever reason, once the 
reversion was made, the Republicans had a consistent colorblind 
principle on race. But "max-black" in 1994 helped produce the 
Republican victory,158 and the threat to their majority in the 2002 
elections prompted Republicans to readopt it in two Southern 
states.159 
Then, after the surprising Republican victory in the off-year 
elections, incoming Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott launched 
into one of his periodic laments that the nation had not followed 
Mississippi in backing Strom Thurmond's 1948 Dixiecrat presi-
dential campaign. Reporters and webloggers dug up ample evi-
dence of Lott's affinities for Thurmond's views. To recover, Lott 
engaged in "serial, unprincipled apologies" going so far on Black 
Entertainment Television as to support affirmative action "abso-
lutely across the board."160 Democrats and the New York Times 
called on the Bush administration to follow Lott's lead and 
abandon its beliefs and to cynicall~ support affirmative action 
because it's "the right thing" to do. 61 The assertion was that to 
cleanse itself of its racist past (and perhaps present), the Repub-
licans should seek absolution by supporting the University of 
Michigan in Bollinger. 162 Indeed, delighted by Lott's hoof-in-
atA7. 
156. The Bennett quote in the previous footnote was rejected by the Republican 
Party's general counsel with the statement that the Bush Justice Department was just 
"carrying out the Voting Rights Act." /d. 
157. 509 u.s. 630 (1993). 
158. Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 723,725-28 (1995). 
159. David E. Rosenbaum, Fight Over Political Map Centers on Race, N.Y. TIMES 
Feb. 21, 2002, at A18 (Mississippi); Adam Cohen, Why Republicans Are Shamelessly in 
Love with the Voting Rights Act, March 24 2002, §4 at 14 (Georgia). 
160. Editorial, Lott and the Race Card, Wall ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at A14. 
161. Editorial, Stand Up for Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A30: 
"[Lott] sounded cynical under the circumstances, but it was also the right thing to say." 
162. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy went so far as to state that the Bush Ad-
ministration "will have to intervene [as amicus] to uphold" the Michigan program. "This 
Week" ABC, Dec. 22, 2002. 
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mouth disease, Democratic Senate leader Tom Daschle claimed 
that failure to support Michigan "should be viewed as a litmus 
test of the administration's commitment to civil rights. "163 
Some Republican operatives also thought that Bush should 
support Michigan because of the abysmally small percentage of 
the African-American vote he received in 2000 and his need to 
court Hispanic voters. 164 Instead, Bush engineered Lott's ouster 
as the GOP leader and then filed an amicus brief opposing the 
University of Michigan's programs (but not declaring that col-
leges could never consider race). 
The Rehnquist Court itself edged away from Bakke and 
Fullilove (as well as Metro Broadcasting165 ) in Croson, 166 Ada-
rand,167 and Shaw v. Reno,168 but it never went all the way to the 
Republican race-neutral position. The Court's stopping point, as 
articulated in Easley v. Cromartie169 and implemented in the 
Michigan cases, appears to be that some but not too much use of 
race is consistent with the Constitution.170 Michigan's under-
graduate admissions policy gave each minority application 20 out 
of 150 possible points (with 100 points guaranteeing admission) 
just for applying. 171 Its law school's "holistic" approach ensured 
that each class would contain a "'critical mass' of [underrepre-
sented] minorities." 172 Like eight Justices who split evenly on 
these cases, the Solicitor General's brief saw no constitutional 
difference between Michigan's programs. Justice O'Connor, 
however, did. The former was an unconstitutional quota, while 
the latter was acceptable at least for a generation. She may have 
found a happy compromise because President Bush put the best 
face he could on the Administration's defeat by declaring the 
opinions "a careful balance" and joined the Court in "look[ing] 
163. NeilL. Lewis, Bush and Affirmative Action, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003 at A1, 
A24. 
164. Jason L. Riley, President Bush Needs to Lead his Party on Race, Wall ST. J., Jan. 
16, 2003, at A12; Adam Nagoumey, Bush and Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2003, at A24. Howard Kurtz, Media Notes, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 16,2003. 
165. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
166. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
167. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
168. 509 u.s. 630 (1993). 
169. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
170. John Hart Ely characterized the Court's position as "indeterminate to the point 
of incoherence." Confounded by Cromartie, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 496 (2002). 
171. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
172. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
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forward to the day when America will truly be a color-blind so-
ciety. "173 
2. Race-Consciousness Is Essential: If there had been any 
doubt about the move of African-Americans to the Democrats 
after the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act, Nixon's South-
ern strategy closed all exits. Furthermore the long-time goal of a 
national policy of nondiscrimination was no longer a goal; it was 
also the supreme law of the land. New goals were necessary, and 
the idea of a color-blind society passed from the scene almost 
before the ink was dry on the 1964 and 1965 Acts. Thus when 
McLaughlin v. Florida174 invalidated an interracial cohabitation 
law, it marked the last time that the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund offered its heretofore standard citation to the first Justice 
Harlan's Plessy dissent for the proposition that the Constitution 
was colorblind and race was a constitutional irrelevance. Three 
years later, the LDF brief in Loving v. Virginia 175 for the first 
time omitted any reference to the Plessy dissent.176 
In the long run, equal opportunities leading to changed re-
sults in the work place depended on improved education. De-
mocrats backed the Court's busing decisions. Just as the Repub-
licans condemned busing, the Democrats deemed it essential, 
but muted their support in light of busing's unpopularity. 177 
The promise of busing to create an integrated society was 
undermined by the Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 178 which held 
that federal judges lacked the power to change school district 
lines and order interdistrict busing. Majority black school dis-
tricts would therefore remain that way; indeed, they would 
probably become increasingly one-race districts. The Court then 
seemingly closed the door on judicial creation of the Democratic 
ideal of an integrated society in Washington v. Davis, 179 which 
held that the disparate impact of laws on African-Americans did 
not even require an explanation, let alone make the laws uncon-
stitutional. The combination of the two cases pushed affirmative 
173. Split Decisions, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 24,2003, at Al. 
174. 378 u.s. 184 (1964. 
175. 388 U.S.l (1967). 
176. POWE, supra note 51, at 286. 
177. 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1728 (1972)(Busing is "another tool.") 32 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC 861 (1976) ("It is clearly our responsibility as a party and as citizens to support 
the principles of our Constitution.") 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC lOOB (1980) ("Mandatory 
transportation ... remains a judicial tool of last resort."). 
178. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
179. 428 u.s. 153 (1976). 
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action to the fore as the remaining way to achieve an integrated 
society. 
African-Americans were Democrats, very loyal ones, and 
therefore the Democrats were committed to race-conscious 
remedies. The limit seemed to be quotas, a poisonous word for 
another Democratic constituency, Jews, and an end that every-
one found objectionable during the debates on the Civil Rights 
Act.180 "By 1969, the bipartisan consensus on which the Civil 
Rights Act rested had collapsed, and civil rights was a bitterly 
partisan issue. The Democratic party ... [t]rying to retain the 
support of organized labor and middle class opinion . . . con-
cealed and obfuscated its growing commitment to race conscious 
remedies." 181 Mention of quotas was forbidden. 
Then in 1972 in a stunning and politically disastrous182 
move, the Democrats required quotas for delegates to their 1972 
convention. Racial and gender quotas were mandatory. Onere-
sult was to unseat Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago delegation.183 
George McGovern tried to escape this issue with an unequivocal 
"rejectMon of] the quota system as detrimental to American so-
ciety." 4 
Unfortunately for African-Americans, strident Republican 
opposition to abortion drove many affluent voters into the De-
mocratic Party, and the Democrats' economic agenda became 
less progressive. 185 As a result, Democrats would grant African-
Americans all kinds of affirmative action, but what the Democ-
rats would not offer was more money for social programs. In the 
process the Democrats became completely wedded to aggressive 
affirmative action as "an essential component of our commit-
ment to expanding civil rights protection."186 Jesse Jackson's 
1984 candidacy drove the party to candor that almost encom-
180. See BELZ, supra note 130, at 24. "The sponsors of Title VII unequivocally re-
jected the view that it was in any way intended or capable of being interpreted to pro-
mote race-conscious preferential practices." 
181. !d. at 34. 
182. !d. at 94 ("When millions of Americans saw delegates on television who had 
been selected according to strict affirmative action rules, it stimulated fears that jobs and 
education would also be apportioned on the basis of quotas rather than merit."). 
183. PATI'ERSON, supra note 142, at 760. 
184. Editorial, The Quota Controversy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1972, at 9. 
185. MARK GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION 133 (1996) ("As the Democratic 
Party becomes a better vehicle for pursuing the liberal abortion policies favored by most 
affluent Americans, that party has become a worse vehicle for pursuing the liberal redis-
tributive policies favored by less affluent Americans."). 
186. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1058 (1980). One might well substitute "only" for "es-
sential." 
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passed using the forbidden term quota: "The Party reaffirms its 
longstanding commitment to the eradication of discrimination in 
all aspects of American life through the use of affirmative action, 
goals, timetables, and other verifiable measurements to overturn 
historic patterns and historic burdens of discrimination."187 
With Bill Clinton, the Democrats for the first time had an 
administration fully supportive of affirmative action, right down 
to quotas in the Cabinet.188 Furthermore, in Deval Patrick, Clin-
ton's second choice to head the Civil Rights Division, Clinton 
had the exact opposite of Reagan's Bradford Reynolds. Whereas 
Reynolds could not find an affirmative action plan he could tol-
erate, Patrick could not find one that went too far. Patrick won 
an intramural battle to intervene in Taxman v. Piscataway, 
where a white teacher was dismissed in favor of an African-
American teacher with identical seniority because budget cuts 
required one to go. What made Taxman particularly unappeal-
ing as a vehicle to sustain affirmative action was that the Pis-
cataway High School already had double the requisite percent-
age of African-American teachers. 189 Then, after the California 
voters adopted Proposition 209 with its anti-discrimination lan-
guage,190 Clinton's spokesman Mike McCurry told reporters that 
the President was following the issue "very carefully" and agreed 
with the Justice Department and a district court judge191 that it 
was unconstitutional. 192 President Clinton then ordered the Jus-
tice Department to intervene on behalf of a challenge to the vot-
ers' right to end affirmative action. 193 
187. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 92B (1984). 
188. "A Cabinet that looks like America" had the requisite 70 percent attorneys. 
189. The school's rationale for dismissing Sharon Taxman was that "diversity" was 
essential not only in the high school as a whole, but in each department as well. Support-
ers of affirmative action breathed a national sigh of relief when Taxman was bought out 
after the Court granted certiorari. 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). 
190. Cal. Canst. Art. 1, §31(a) ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnic-
ity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting."). 
191. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
192. David Tell, Sophistry and Affirmative Action, The WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 3, 
1997, at 9. At a time when Adarand made it arguable that all of California's programs 
were unconstitutional, a judge ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the 
California voters from discontinuing them, and Clinton and his Justice Department 
thought so, too. 
193. Michael Kelly, Breach of Promise, The NEW REPUBLIC, April 28, 1997 at 4. The 
intervention did not help the challengers as the Ninth Circuit reversed. Coalition for 
Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th 1997). 
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The 1994 election changed the politics of affirmative action 
by giving the Republicans control of both houses of Congress 
and therefore the first chance legislatively to implement their 
views. Nevertheless, a Clinton veto could have negated their less 
than supermajority. As it happened, however, Adarand changed 
the landscape by moving executive action to the foreground 
while the legislature watched. Clinton offered "mend it, don't 
end it," a thorough reanalysis by the Civil Rights Division of 
federal affirmative action programs. 
Clinton's support for affirmative action foreshadowed the 
outcome of the review. Essentially "mending" it meant eliminat-
ing only gratuitous discrimination against whites. 
It does not mean-and I don't favor-the unjustified prefer-
ence of the unqualified over the qualified of any race or gen-
der. It doesn't mean-and I don't favor-numerical quotas. It 
doesn't mean-and I don't favor-rejection or selection of 
any employee or student solely on the basis of race or gender 
without regard to merit." 194 
Not surprisingly, only token corrections were necessary to 
"mend it," and "ending it" was never considered. Yet when even 
Ronald Dworkin acknowledged that "unless the court changes 
direction, affirmative action is finished as a means of securing 
racial diversity in industry or business,"195 the Clinton admini-
stration's tenacity was an extraordinary testament to the Democ-
rats' commitment to race consciousness. 
D. ABORTION 
1. Roe Must Go: When abortion emerged as a political is-
sue, it recognized no party lines. 196 Robert Packwood introduced 
legislation both to create a national right to abortion197 and to 
liberalize the District of Columbia's law.198 Nelson Rockefeller 
194. THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 28, 1997 at 4. This was, however, movement from 
the Justice Department's position in Taxman. 
195. Ronald Dworkin, Race and the Uses of Law, NEW YORK TIMES, April13, 2001, 
at A19. 
196. Thus one of the initial votes on the Hyde Amendment to prevent funding of 
abortions had the following divisions in the House (with the negatives in the majority): 
Republicans 98-70, northern Democrats 96-35, southern Democrats 53-18. 30 CoNG. Q. 
ALMANAC, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 76-H (1974) 
197. The National Abortion Act would "guarantee and protect" the "fundamental 
constitutional right" of a woman to "control her own fertility." S. 3746,91 Cong. 2d Sess. 
(1970). 
198. S. 3501, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970). 
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presided over the legalization of abortion in New York. 199 
George McGovern was mildly pro-abortion.200 Republicans were 
the leaders on both sides in the congressional battles of the 
1970s.201 With "elites in both parties favoring legal abortion, the 
elite Justices on the Supreme Court proved quite sympathetic to 
the claims that women had a constitutional right to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy. "202 
Although some commentators expected Roe to settle the 
abortion controversy, Roe instead moved a state issue into na-
tional politics, where neither party was ready to deal with it.203 
While both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter felt that Roe had 
gone too far, abortion was peripheral to the 1976 campaign. Four 
years later, George Bush ran for the presidency with an identical 
position in a changed political landscape: no federal fundin~ of 
abortion and no constitutional amendments to roll back Roe. 
In both legalizing and politicizing abortion, Roe managed 
simultaneously to create its own opposition205 as well as to cause 
its supporters to demobilize (at least partially)/06 thereby yield-
ing the offense to its opponents, initially led by the Catholic 
Church.207 Henry Hyde offered the first successful assault on Roe 
with his amendment prohibiting the federal funding of abortions. 
The votes on the Hyde Amendment indicated strong Republican 
support in the House with Democrats more evenly split.208 But 
199. In 1970 New York adopted a law legalizing all abortions in the first twenty-four 
weeks of a woman's pregnancy. See BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, 
ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 42, 74 (1993). 
200. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Sept. 7, 1972 at 2222. (Abortion was "a private matter 
which should be decided by a pregnant woman and her own doctor" while inconsistently 
also stating abortion was "a matter to be left to state governments.") Following Hubert 
H. Humphrey's lead in California primary against McGovern, Republicans referred to 
McGovern as the "triple A" candidate: "Abortion, Acid, Amnesty." PAlTERSON, supra 
note 142, at 759. 
201. CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 117. 
202. GRABER, supra note 185, at 153. 
203. In their platform Republicans conceded the issue of abortion was "one of the 
most difficult and controversial of our time." They protested the Court's "intrusion into 
the family structure" and supported a constitutional amendment. They also called for a 
"public dialogue" on the issue. Republican Party Platform, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., 
Aug. 21, 1976, at 2298. The Democratic Party Platform "fully recognize[d] the religious 
and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abor-
tion." CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., July 17,1976, at 1918. 
204. CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 165. 
205. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 182-89 (1991). 
206. GRABER, supra note 185, at 126. 
207. CRAIG & O'BRIEN,supra note 199, at 43-45. 
208. The Senate votes reflected less ;:nthusiasm against Roe by both parties, but the 
Senate could only force compromise language upon the House. 
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the votes may have been misleading as abortion supporters did 
not fight as hard as they might have because they were confident 
that any legislative defeats would be erased in the judiciary.209 
Roe also coincided with the social and political strengthen-
ing of "born again" Christians. By the end of the 1970s, opposi-
tion to Roe took on a conservative cast and placed itself squarely 
into the Republican Party, where it found a champion in Ronald 
Reagan. The former California ~overnor had signed a liberaliza-
tion law in California in 196721 but ran as a firm antiabortion 
candidate in 1976 and even more so in his successful1980 bid for 
the Republican nomination, when he labeled Roe "an abuse of 
power as bad as the transgressions of Watergate and the bribery 
on Capital Hill."211 On securing the nomination, Reagan brought 
the Republican Party fully to an anti-Roe position from which 
Republicans have not retreated.212 In 1988, the second time 
George Bush ran for the presidenc:X, his position, like that of 
Reagan, was solidli13 antiabortion. 14 George W. Bush, at the 
beginning of his administration, reinstated Ronald Reagan's ex-
ecutive order (which Bill Clinton repealed) prohibiting United 
States funding of international agencies that subsidize abor-
tion.215 
The Reagan administration moved well beyond the denials 
of federal funding216 that had previously represented a popular 
209. See GRABER, supra note 185, at 121-22. Furthermore, prominent pro-choice 
groups like the National Abortion Rights Action League, Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion, the National Organization for Women, and the American Civil Liberties Union 
were organizations with strong legal staffs and central offices and had a natural bias fa-
voring litigation over politics. STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 199. 
210. ROSENBERG, supra note 205, at 268. 
211. Byron W. Daynes & Raymond Tatalovich, Presidential Politics and Abortion, 
1972-1988,22 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 545,549 (1992) (quoting Reagan). 
212. The plank in the Republican platform on abortion always "reaffirms" the 
party's "support" for a constitutional amendment overturning Roe. There is a helpful 
comparison of the two parties' platforms on abortion in CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 
199, at 166-68. 
213. Graber calls it "rabidly" pro-life. Graber, supra note 185, at 140. 
214. "After years of sober and serious reflection on the issue, I think the Supreme 
Court's decision in Roe was wrong and should be overturned ... I promise the president 
hears you now and stands with you in a cause that must be won." Laura Sessions Stepp 
and Ann Devroy, Bush Cites Abortion 'Tragedy' in Call to 67,000 Protesters, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 24, 1989, at Al. 
215. 66 FED. REG. 3878 (2001). Network news coverage of the Clinton and Bush ac-
tions was scrupulously fair. Peter Jennings on ABC reported that Clinton had "kept his 
word on abortion rights." Bush was "taking a hard line." Tom Brokaw of NBC agreed 
that Clinton had "kept the campaign promise" while Bush's action was "controversial." 
Dan Rather on CBS concluded that Bush had acted to "please the right flank of his 
party." National Public Radio, "Morning Edition," February 1, 2<!01. 
216. Funding cut-offs to poor women not only were constitutional, see Maher v. Roe, 
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nibbling at Roe.217 By 1983, the Justice Department made the 
overruling of Roe goal number one. While awaiting that happy 
day, but finding it a little far off, the Administration showed its 
devotion to "life" by proposing "Baby Jane Doe" regulations 
that would have imposed upon hospitals, doctors, and parents 
the duty to save newborns with the severest birth defects 
through their last possible painful dying breath.218 
The judicial battle over Roe commenced with a pattern of 
stacking the lower federal courts with judges opposed to abor-
tion219 -so much so that a charitable contribution to Planned 
Parenthood was disqualifying.220 Then the Justice Department 
applied the same standard at the Supreme Court, with two con-
servatives from the D.C. Circuit, Antonin Scalia and then 
Robert Bork. Scalia sailed through a Republican Senate as the 
Democrats misfired at the elevation of Rehnquist to Chief Jus-
tice.221 Bork, however, faced a newly Democratic Senate, and 
from the time Reagan nominated Bork until Bill Clinton de-
feated Bush, the abortion battle was played out at the Supreme 
Court, either in litigation or with efforts to find the ever-elusive 
fifth vote to kill Roe. 
The hearings on Bork's nomination-the "borking of 
Bork"-gave the entire nation a basic and easily understood les-
son in Legal Realism 101. 222 The Constitution protected a right 
to an abortion. No Article V changes in the Constitution were 
possible. If Bork were confirmed, then the Constitution would 
change and not protect a right to an abortion. Therefore, we are 
432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), they did not affect the most 
ardent supporters of abortion, affluent women. See GRABER, supra note 185, at 126, 136-
37. 
217. "The Republican Senate rolled over its moderate leadership ... and approved 
the strongest anti-abortion provisions Congress has ever passed." Helen Dewa, Toughest 
Curbs on Abortion Funds Voted by Senate, WASH. POST, May 22, 1981, at Al. The House 
was always more antiabortion than the Senate. 
218. 49 FED. REG. 1622 (1984). 
219. The 1980 Republican Party Platform demanded "the appointment of judges at 
all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of inno-
cent human life." CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., July 19, 1980, at 2046. "Innocent human life" 
was anti-abortion code for the unborn. 
220. Andrew Frey, a deputy Solicitor General, had his nomination withdrawn-at 
the behest of thirteen Senators-on this basis. See CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 
175. See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING F'EDERALJUDGES (1997). 
221. L.A. Powe, Jr., From Bark to Souter, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 784-85 
(1991). 
222. Bark: a verb, gerund, or noun. To bark is to use character assassination and 
gro~s dist~rtions against a nominee whose position on the only issue worth caring about 
IS d1ame~ncally opp~sed to the barker and has the likelihood of prevailing. Barkers jus-
tify borkmg on the highest principle: that the end justifies the means. 
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(at least in part) a government of men and not of laws. Republi-
cans overwhelmingly backed Bork, but the Senate was Democ-
ratic.223 
The defeat of Bork did not lessen Reagan's and (perhaps) 
Bush's desire to undo Roe. It demanded a different strategy, one 
that played out with David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Be-
sides being Republicans, their attraction was that neither had a 
so-called "paper trail." Souter, "the stealth candidate,"224 was so 
obscure that no one had heard of him. Thomas was better 
known, having been in the Reagan administration before going 
on the D.C. Circuit,225 but he claimed never to have debated Roe 
in his life.226 With no paper trail, too man~ Democrats believed 
there was no le~timate reason to vote no.2 7 Republicans needed 
no convincing.2 
Republicans were outraged when Souter (and Kennedy) 
joined O'Connor in the conclusion that Roe was too politically 
divisive to overrule and therefore everyone should cease debat-
ing the issue.229 The half a loaf ceded-that regulations not un-
reasonably burdensome on the core right to an abortion were 
valid-was just not enough. Not only had the Court-packing 
strategy for overruling Roe failed, it had come to a forced ending 
with the Clinton election, so much so that after two further Su-
preme Court appointments even the procedure labeled by anti-
abortion activists as "partial birth abortion" could not be 
223. Republicans voted 40-6 to confirm, but were overwhelmed by a solid Democ-
ratic vote, 52-2 to reject (David Boren of Oklahoma and Ernest Hollings of South Caro-
lina). 
224. STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 214 (quoting Sen. Howell Heflin's description). 
225. Before going on the D.C. Qrcuit, Thomas had been head of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission. Like the Republican Party generally, he opposed 
race-based remedies, except where the specific individual had been discriminated against 
by the defendant. 
226. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 102nd 
Cong. 1st. Sess. J-102-40 at 1450-51 (1991). Critics suggested that Thomas was either ly-
ing or incompetent (or perhaps both). It turns out that he was giving a "very Clin-
tonesque" answer. William Branford Reynolds states: "I know we discussed it. I think 
that he thought little of Roe v. Wade .... From a scholarly standpoint, we were talking 
about constitutional law, constitutional issues, and Supreme Court decisions. It was clear 
he didn't think much of it." ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS 246 (2001) 
(quoting Reynolds). 
227. Democrats supplied 46 of the 48 negatives with eleven voting for Thomas. One 
of the 11, Richard Shelby of Alabama, subsequently switched parties. Anita Hill's allega-
tions about sexual advances (in the climate of 1991 and the fact that Thomas had been at 
the EEOC at the time of the advances) supplied the legitimate reason for opposing him. 
228. Republicans voted 41-to 2 to confirm. Robert Packwood of Oregon and James 
Jeffords of Vermont voted against Thomas. Jeffords left the Republican Party in 2001. 
229. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865--69. 
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banned.230 At best, the overruling of Roe could be revived as a 
hope and threat every fourth year. 
Republicans also knew that the electorate agreed with Ca-
sey: restrict abortions, but keep them legal.231 Both as governor 
and as presidential candidate, George W. Bush acknowledged 
his party's platform calling for an amendment to ban abortions 
and brushed it aside as having no chance of passage. Although 
he would not pledge to appoint only antiabortion Justices to the 
Court,232 he gave no indication that he wouldn't, especially when 
he called attention to the fact that his favorite Justices were 
Scalia and Thomas. His controversial nominees to the courts of 
appeals signal that he will nominate only pro-life Justices to the 
Court. Nevertheless, neither John Roberts nor Samuel Alito, 
while pro-life, could definitively be placed in the anti-Rae camp. 
2. Choice Without Restrictions: The Democratic position on 
abortion jelled in response to the Republicans. The votes on the 
Hyde Amendment had shown that northern Democrats with 
minimal Catholic constituencies were solidly in favor of abor-
tion. And the pro-litigation bias of abortion proponents, with its 
implicit offer of a legislative pass as necessary, undoubtedly 
masked some latent Democratic support for Roe. But Reagan's 
assault on Roe solidified the Democrats.233 Their 1980 platform 
"fully recognized the religious and ethical concerns" Americans 
had about abortion, but supported Roe as the "law of the 
land."234 Four years later, the agonizing was gone. Reproductive 
freedom was "a fundamental human right," and Democrats op-
posed any "interference," especially a "lack of funding for 
poorer women. "235 The language thereafter changed a bit, but 
reproductive choice was always so "fundamental" that it should 
230. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
231. "[Casey] was the perfect ruling. The Court basically came out where the Ameri-
can people are, [that is) abortion should remain legal, but reasonable restrictions can ap· 
ply." WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT 149 (2003) (quoting ABC reporter Cokie 
Roberts). "[T]hat's the kind of approach that the public opinion polls say the voters 
like .... So the Justices ... may have come down just about where the country is on this 
one." /d. (quoting CBS reporter Bruce Morton). 
232. /d. at 248, 251 
233. GRABER, supra note 185, at 137-38 ("The Democratic Party adopted much stronger 
pro-choice positions during the 1980s than during the 1970s. As a result, that coalition lost the 
alle~iance of some strongly pro-life New Dealers, but it attracted some strongly pro-
chmce voters who formerly had supported GOP candidates.). 
234. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 97B (1980). 
235. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 93B (1984). 
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be available without regard for ability to pay regardless of what 
the Court had concluded.236 
The Democrats' shift can be perfectly seen in Al Gore, 
whose moves were the mirror opposite of the elder Bush.237 As a 
congressman, Gore talked the talk and voted the vote of the an-
tiabortion movement.238 As a Senator running for President in 
1988, he was firmly pro-choice. After eight years as Vice-
President, he denied he had ever been anything but a fan of 
Roe.239 But a Democrat must be even more. Thus Gore "seized 
on the close vote in Stenberg v. Carhart [to preclude banning so-
called partial birth abortions] to warn that Mr. Bush, if elected, 
would appoint conservative Supreme Court Justices hostile to 
abortion rights. "240 
Thus by the mid-1980s, "the national Democratic and Re-
publican parties offered voters a clear choice on abortion. "241 
After the defeat of Bork, the Democrats remained worried 
about Supreme Court appointees, but Casey and Clinton's 1992 
win enabled the Democrats to survive the Republican surge. Or 
so everyone thought until the 1994 Republican upset. Thereafter 
the Democrats had to play serious defense, which they did by 
adopting the joint playbooks of the National Rifle Association 
and the American Civil Liberties Union. They opposed any laws, 
no matter how reasonable, that restricted abortions. The reason-
ing, like that of the NRA and ACLU, was quite simple. They did 
not want to give their opponents any legislative victories that 
might offer even the slightest encouragement. They did not want 
a single wedge that could lead to further judicial weakening of 
236. See CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 167--{i8. 
237. Richard Gephardt is an equally illustrative example. On January 21, 2003, all 
the 2004 Democratic presidential hopefuls swore fealty to Roe, and the most interesting 
was Gephardt, who had been pro-life during his first decade in the House, but who ex· 
plained to the audience how he had changed on the issue by coming to understand the 
wisdom of the pro-choice position. He did not mention that this nicely coincided with his 
first attempt at the presidency in 1988. Adam Nagoumey, In Turn, 6 Presidential Hope-
fuls Back Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,2003, at A17. 
238. "What is clear from a review of his public statements on the issue and the votes 
he cast in Congress is that the vice president's position on abortion has changed over the 
trajectory of his political career. And it was not a small shift: in the early 1980's, when 
Mr. Gore was representing middle Tennessee in the House, the National Right to Life 
Committee said he had voted in line with the group's views 84 percent of the time." 
Robin Toner, Shifting Views over Abortion Fog Gore, N.Y. DMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at Al. 
239. Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Abortion Stance Evolved, Gore Says, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al4. 
240. Jim Yardley, AI Gore Claims Bush Would Appoint Anti-Abortion Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2000, at Al. 
241. GRABER, supra note 185, at 138. 
2004] POLITICAL BATTLE FOR CONSTITUTION 677 
the constitutional right. Thus President Clinton vetoed the so-
called partial birth abortion laws each time Congress presented 
them to him/42 and Democratic votes sustained the vetoes.243 
And when congressional Republicans in 2001 again244 introduced 
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, a bill imposing penalties on 
people who harm a fetus during an assault on a pregnant women, 
Democrats voiced displeasure, even though the bill protected a 
woman's right to choose.245 Their votes followed their objec-
tions.246 No one noted the irony that Democrats would have 
happily protected the woman if she were not pregnant, while the 
Republicans would not have because the crime would have been 
a state issue. The 2004 version of the bill, now known as the Laci 
Peterson Law47 after the eight-months pregnant woman who 
was murdered Christmas Eve 2002, was highlighted in a 
Bush/Cheney ad called "Values." The ad noted that although 
John Kerry had missed two-thirds of all Senate votes while cam-
paigning, he was present to vote "no" on this law.248 
This has been matched by executive orders (in limited 
cases) defining "child" and "fetus." President Clinton proposed 
a definition of "fetus" as "the product of conception during 
pregnancl until a determination is made after delivery that it is 
viable."24 President Bush, in turn, authored expansion of prena-
tal care by labeling the fetus an unborn child.250 
242. See H.R. 1833, 32 Weekly Comp. 645 (1996); H.R. 1122, 33 Weekly Comp. 1545 
(1997). 
243. In 1997 House Democrats voted 127-77 to support the ban, but the House Re-
publican vote of 218-8 was enough for an override. The Senate, however, could not over-
ride, with Democrats providing 32 of the 36 negative votes (and only 13 affirmative 
(Southerners, Catholics, and those representing substantial Catholic populations): Biden, 
Breaux, Byrd, Conrad, Daschele, Dorgan, Ford, Hollings, Johnson, Landrieu, Leahy, 
Moynihan, and Reid. 1144 CONG. REC. 896 (1998). 
244. It had passed the House in the previous Congress, but the Senate took no action 
because there were not the votes to override the automatic Clinton veto. 
245. Juliet Eilpcrin, House GOP Pushes New Abortion Limits, WASH. POST, March 
16, 2001, at A1 (quoting Rep. Jerrold Nadler): "[the] real purpose is to establish a doc-
trine, contrary to the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, that the fetus is a separate 
person. This is driven by the politics of abortion rather than the substantive effort to fight 
violence against women." 
246. Republicans provided 198 of the 252 ayes; Democrats, 150 of the 172 negatives. 
Alison Mitchell, House Approves Bill Criminalizing Violence to Fetus, N.Y. TIMES, April 
27,2001, at Al. 
247. The official name is the "Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004." Pub. L. No. 
108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004). 
248. The Senate vote was 61-38. The only prominent Democrat to vote yes was Tom 
Daschle, who was up for reelection. 
249. 66 FED. REG. 3879 (2001). 
250. 67 FED. REG. 61,956 (2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 457). 
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The issues the Democrats could never win were government 
funding for low-income abortions, preventing parental notifica-
tion laws, and finally the procedure opponents described as par-
tial birth abortion. Without a Democrat in the White House to 
veto a procedure viewed even by some Democrats as morally 
repugnant/51 Senate Democratic leader Thomas Daschle con-
cluded that it was time to move the matter out of Congress and 
into the courts.252 
Democrats rna~ have yielded on the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003/ but not on their support for Roe. In the 
twenty years following the Carter presidency, not a single pro-
life Democrat made a dent in the presidential derby. Congress-
man Dennis Kucinich had a zero rating from the National Abor-
tion and Reproductive Rights Action League in 2000. Running 
for President in 2003, he proposed a litmus test of support for 
Roe without so much as missing a beat.254 The Democrats' fealty 
on the issue ran so deep that Pennsylvania governor Robert Ca-
sey was not even allowed to speak at the 1992 convention be-
cause of his pro-life position. 255 
E. RELIGION 
1. Pledging in Public: Prior to Roe, no case ~roduced a big-
ger flood of hostile mail than Engel v. Vitale. 56 Engel came 
without warning and was met with a huge public outcry.257 It 
drew an immediate effort by Congressman Frank Becker, a 
Catholic Republican from New York, supported by Southern 
Democrats and Midwestern Republicans, to overturn it via a 
constitutional amendment. Interestingly, those Protestants most 
hostile to Engel and the next year's addition, Schempp,258 -
251. Kate Michelman, president of Naral Pro-Choice, lamented that the Republicans 
"ran away with this debate in the public domain by constantly describing this procedure." 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, BiU Barring Abortion Procedure Drew Big Backing from Many 
Friends of Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A16. An earlier statement by 
Senator Rick Santorum showed how effective antiabortion rhetoric could be: "There 
may be a medical need to terminate a pregnancy, but there is never a need to kill a 
baby." SALETAN, supra note 231, at 234. 
252. Stolberg, supra note 251, at A16 
253. Pub.L. No. 108-105,117 Stat. 1201 (2003). 
254. William Sale tan, Early Labor, SLATE. COM, May 19, 2003. 
255. Walter Goodman, The Convention Images, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1992, at 48. 
256. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
257. See POWE, supra note 51, at 187-89. Earl Warren recalled a headline proclaim-
ing that "Court outlaws God." MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 316 (1977). 
258. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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fundamentalists, evangelicals, Pentecostals, and charismatics259 -
sat out this political issue, like all others.260 As Jerry Falwell ex-
plained in 1965, "We pay our taxes, cast our votes as a responsi-
bility of citizenship, obey the laws of the land, and other things 
demanded of us by the society in which we live. But at the same 
time we are cognizant that our only pur~ose on this earth is to 
know Christ and to make him known." 61 Instead, at hearings 
that House Judiciary Chair Emanuel Celler reluctantly called, a 
veritable "who's who" of organized Protestant denominations 
lined up to argue against any modification of the establishment 
clause, and supporters of the proposal knew it was dead?62 
Prayer in schools was not, however, as the Court's decisions 
were widely and publicly ignored in both the South and Mid-
west.263 School prayer has always been more popular with voters 
than with members of Congress. Verball~ supporting it is both 
easy and cheap, and the Republicans did. 64 Amending the Con-
stitution is something else altogether, and a prayer amendment 
never saw a vote. 
Prayer reappeared as a political issue when the evangelicals 
came out of their self-imposed exile and entered into electoral 
politics at the end of the 1970s.265 They were disgusted by the 
moral decline of the country on the one hand266 and were at-
259. These Protestants are often labeled as the Religious or Christian Right, typi-
cally by people who have never referred to the Christian Left. For simplicity's sake, we 
will call them evangelicals. 
260. "Evangelicals concentrate on conversion, and except for occasional efforts to 
outlaw what they deem to be personal vices, evangelical Protestant groups largely ignore 
social and political efforts at reform." Robert Wuthnow, Political Rebinh of American 
Evangelicalism, in THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT 168 (Robert C. Liebman and Robert 
Wuthnow eds., 1983). 
261. A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 316 (1985). 
262. The National Council of Churches, the Baptists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Sev-
enth-Day Adventists, Unitarians, and the United Church of Christ opposed any amend-
ment, and the legal department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference advised 
Catholics to be "very cautious" in supporting any amendment. See POWE, supra note 51, 
at 362. 
263. See generally KENNETii DOLBEARE & PHILIP HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL 
PRAYER DECISIONS (1971). 
264. 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2166 (1972): "We reaffirm our view that voluntary 
prayer should be freely permitted in public places-particularly, by school children while 
attending public schools." 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 9fJ7 (1976): "Local communities wish-
ing to conduct non-sectarian prayers in their public schools should be able to do so." 
265. One "bemused" evangelical noted of a Reagan rally, "(t]housands of people 
were cheering for all they were worth-cheering away the eschatological doctrines of a 
lifetime, cheering away the theological pessimism of a lifetime." REICHLEY, supra note 
261, at 322-23. 
266. See id., at 316--17. Charles Cade, the first operations director of the Moral Ma-
jority, chose this indelicate way of putting it: "Abortion, pornography, homosexuality-
those are hard for the average Christians to relate to. They don't read Playboy, their 
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tracted to the 1976 presidential campaign of one of their own, 
Jimmy Carter, on the other.267 But the catalyst came when 
Carter's Internal Revenue Service switched enforcement polifls 
on the tax-exempt status of their all-white Christian schools.2 8 
Carter had done nothing on issues evangelicals cared about, and 
the Republicans promised they would. In Reagan, the Republi-
cans offered a candidate who claimed to care, and the evangeli-
cals flocked to his banner269 and to a party specifically willing to 
invoke its faith in God.270 
Using rights-based language usually associated with Democ-
rats, Republicans called on "Congress to restore the right of in-
dividuals to participate in voluntary non-denominational prayer 
in schools and other public facilities. "271 The shift to rights-based 
rhetoric was important. "Mindful of our religious diversity, we 
reaffirm our commitment to the freedoms of religion and speech 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and firmly 
support the rights of students to openly practice the same, in-
cluding the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools. "272 
Students could worship Karl Marx, they said; why was there not 
an equal right to pray to their God? The answer was either "co-
ercion" or Jefferson's metaphorical "wall of separation" be-
tween church and state, or both. To the former, the Republicans 
emphasized the "voluntary" nature of any prayer.273 To the lat-
ter, Republicans adopted the positions Potter Stewart had taken 
dissenting in the prayer cases:274 that the real issue was one of 
daughters aren't pregnant, and they don't know any queers." MATIHEW C. MOEN, THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND CONGRESS 3 (1989). 
267. REICHLEY, supra note 261, at 318 ("Without making much public effort, Carter 
attracted widespread support from evangelicals and fundamentalists, who regarded him 
somewhat as Catholics had regarded John Kennedy in 1960.") 
268. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 98, at 131-32. Falwell noted that "[i]t was the 
IRS trying to take away our tax exemptions that made us realize we had to fight for our 
lives." MOEN, supra note 263, at 27. The tax-exempt status of Christian schools had been 
problematical, at best, since 1970, but the IRS had never challenged the schools' status. 
Id. at 26. 
269. See REICHLEY, supra note 261, at 318-27. 
270. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 59B (1980) ("With God's help, let us now, together 
make America great again."); 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 46A (1992) ("free men and 
women, with faith in God"). 
271. 36 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 63B (1984). This is an interesting linguistic switch from 
the 1976 platform, which called for a constitutional amendment. See 32 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC 907 (1976). 
272. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC SOB (1984). 
273. The emphasis on voluntariness was a shift from the 1976 platform which did not 
mention the word: "Local communities wishing to conduct non-sectarian prayers in their 
public schools should be able to do so." 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 907 (1976). 
274. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444 (dissenting); Abingdon School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,308 (dissenting). 
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free exercise rather than establishment, and the free exercise 
claim trumped. With prayer resting on the rights of individuals 
to engage in the free exercise of religion, Republican analysis 
left the establishment clause in the dust. 
Even in his confusion during his first debate with Walter 
Mondale, President Reagan could state the Republican view of 
the intertwining of the two clauses: 
[Some want] to hinder that part of the Constitution that says 
the government shall not only not establish a religion, it shall 
not inhibit the practice of religion. And they have been using 
these things to have government, through court orders, inhibit 
the practice of religion. A child wants to say grace in the 
school cafeteria, and a court rules that they can't do it.275 
The main success of the free exercise strategy came after 
Democrats defeated a voluntary prayer amendment.276 Realiz-
ing, albeit belatedly, that simple access to schools could accom-
plish much the same thing, Republicans took the legislative way 
and routed the Democrats who couldn't find a way to come out 
against rights-based equality.277 The Equal Access Act of 1984278 
extended Widmar v. Vincent's279 holding that colleges must treat 
student religious groups who wished to use campus meeting 
rooms equally with nonreligious ones and applied it to secondary 
(but not elementary) schools. 
Reagan's electoral strength never extended to bring in Re-
publicans to the House, and the Equal Access Act was a one-
time legislative victory.280 After the 1982 elections/81 efforts 
275. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 111B (1984). 
276. The story is best told in ALLEN D. HERTZKE, REPRESENTING Goo IN 
WASHINGTON 167-94 (1988). The Senate Judiciary Committee also reported out a silent 
prayer amendment, S. Rep. 99-165, but no amendment is necessary for that and it died 
without a vote because of lack of enthusiasm. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND 
AUTHENTIC ACTS 452 (1996). 
277. The Washington Post, perhaps speaking for the silent Democrats, ran six edito-
rials against what it called the "Son of School Prayer." /d. at 169. 
278. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984). 
279. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
280. The only other religion-related statute that Congress passed was a bill forbid-
ding the Justice Department to take action against schools that allowed silent prayer. 
Since the Reagan Justice Department had no such intention, this Democratic sponsored 
piece of legislation was entirely symbolic. See MOEN, supra note 266, at 97. Tuition tax 
credits failed. 
281. The Democrats gained 26 seats and changed the composition of the Judiciary 
Committee from a Democratic margin of 16-12 to 20-11. /d. at 111. Even Reagan's 1984 
landslide victory netted only 17 new Republican House members and a loss of two Sen-
ate seats. In 1986 the Democrats gained eight more seats in the Senate to retake control. 
See MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY 646, 657 (1989). 
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quickly Earalleled those aiming at Rae-change through the ju-
diciary.2 2 The Justice Department's vetting of potential judicial 
nominees is well-known. What is less known is that beginning 
with the 1982 Term, the Solicitor General began to file amicus 
briefs urging a doctrinal move to accommodation in all estab-
lishment clause cases.283 The Republicans achieved some modest 
results in the mid-1980s as the Court relaxed opposition to aid to 
religious schools,284 approved payments to a legislative chap-
lain,285 and sustained a municipal Christmas-is-the-time-to-shop 
nativity scene.286 
At this point, the parallels between abortion and prayer 
converge to a single story through the first Bush administration. 
Although nothing logically requires these results, Justices who 
support Roe also support a strong separationist position,287 
whereas Justices who would overturn Roe turn out to be quite 
antiseparationist.288 Justices striving for middle ground, such as 
O'Connor and Kennedy, find both some restrictions on abortion 
and some accommodation of religion consistent with the under-
lying constitutional principles. Thus it appears that knowing a 
nominee's views on either of these issues provides a window to 
the other.289 But for Republicans it is still a tough prediction be-
cause they lack good nonlegal surrogates for public views on the 
two issues. Nominating a Catholic would work; fundamentalist 
or evangelical lawyers with the requisite stature are harder to 
find?90 Democrats have easy predictive surrogates. Select either 
a (non-Orthodox) Jew or someone who is not religious. Indeed, 
for Democrats the only true risk is picking a Catholic. 
In this respect, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder's hysteri-
cal reaction to the nomination of Clarence Thomas is instructive. 
Conceding that Thomas was qualified to sit on the Court, Wilder 
282. STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 206. 
283. The change came between lArkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) during 
the 1981 Term and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783 (1983) which were argued in April1983. By the start of the next Term, the Jus-
tice Department had blessed the Court with its views "on more than half of the 113 cases 
already set for argument." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 206. 
284. 463 u.s. 388. 
285. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783. 
286. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 
287. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and now Breyer and Ginsburg. 
288. Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas. 
289. Justice Souter may or may not fit this mold, although a good bet may be that if 
his Establishment Oause position holds, he will become more supportive of Roe. 
290. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft probably has the stature but would be 
unconfirmable. 
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nevertheless pronounced his "devout" Catholicism as the issue. 
"The ~uestion is: How much allegiance does he have to the 
Pope?" 91 This was hardly the wisest statement for the first Afri-
can-American to be given a serious chance to win the Democ-
ratic presidential nomination (for unlike Jesse Jackson, Wilder 
drew considerable white support). Not only was the remark big-
oted, it was ignorant. Thomas was divorced, remarried, and was 
attending an Episcopal church.292 To his credit, Wilder quickly 
recanted.293 There were no similar comments with the nomina-
tions of John Roberts and Samuel Alito. 
Republicans continued to woo successfully the religious 
right into their electoral base. Apart from rhetoric, however, 
they did little to promote an accomodationist view of religion as 
a matter of policy. Republican support for tuition tax credits, 
and later for school vouchers, implicated the establishment 
clause and were popular among evangelicals, but those issues 
and their politics were about much more than religion. The 
Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris294 puts the estab-
lishment clause objections largely to rest because the majority 
opinion offers an easy roadmap for a constitutional program. Fu-
ture battles over vouchers will be fought on their (educational) 
merits, and the teachers unions (and therefore the Democrats) 
will be vocal in opposition. 
Then came George W. Bush with a centerpiece of his cam-
paign being his plan to encourage "faith-based initiatives," to 
help solve social problems. After the inauguration, rhetoric 
turned to reality when he issued an executive order creating an 
"Office of Faith-Based and Community lnitiatives."295 After 
September 11, however, the Bush administration bailed, at least 
in its initial push.296 The official justification for the administra-
tion's action was that priorities had necessarily changed, and, 
furthermore, that Americans' generous contributions to charities 
mitigated much of the need for the legislation. The faith-based 
291. No author, Gov Wilder is questioning Role of Thomas' Religion, Wall ST. J., July 
3, 1991, at AS. 
292. Editorial, In the Pocket of the Pope? WASH. POST, July 8, 1991, at Al. 
293. /d. 
294. 536 u.s. 639 (2002). 
295. Establishment of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initia-
tives, Exec. Order No. 13,199 (2001). 
296. See Elizabeth Becker, Bush is Said to Scale Back His Religion-Based Initiative, 
N.Y. nMES, Oct 14, 2001, at A14 (reporting that Bush had "set aside his most ambitious 
plans to give federal money to religious charities" and would support a watered-down 
version of his religion-based initiative). 
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proposals also looked different after an exchange between two 
Republican activist evangelical ministers, Jerry Falwell and Pat 
Robertson, that the September 11 attack might be God's retribu-
tion for the nation harboring the likes of the ACLU.297 No 
amount of apologizing298 by the preachers could erase the under-
lying theocratic vision. Despite Bush's disassociation from the 
remarks, the episode may well have led to his faith-based initia-
tive being seen in a more hostile light. It also highlighted parti-
san divisions over competing visions of the Constitution, thereby 
making compromise unlikely. 
After a pause, however, the White House decided to bypass 
the Congress (and Democratic and to a lesser extent Republican 
opposition) and use administrative venues to try to accomplish 
the President's goals. Thus the Department of Interior switched 
policy on grants for historic preservation to allow federal funds 
to be used to renovate churches. 
2. A High and Impregnable Wall of Separation: Beginning 
with George McGovern (with assists from Walter Mondale, 
Jerry Brown, and Bill Clinton), secularists within the Democrats' 
electoral coalition have increased considerably. Over half of the 
delegates at the 1992 convention rarely attended church.299 In a 
world in which one of the best ways to predict a person's politi-
cal affiliation is to ask how often he or she goes to church, those 
who do not are Democrats. This is even truer among party pro-
fessionals, who are not only unfamiliar with religion, but also are 
"sometimes quite antagonistic" to it.300 Candidates do not talk 
about religion both because it would alienate part of the multi-
cultural Democratic electorate and because the party's position 
is that religion and government must be kept apart. Thus, the 
"usual Democratic response" to Ronald Reagan's mention of re-
ligion was "either to ignore the religious issue or to denounce 
Mr. Reagan for mixing religion and politics."301 
297. Gustav Niebuhr, After the Attacks: Finding Fault, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at 
A18 ("I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the 
gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the 
ACLU, People for the American Way-all of them who have tried to secularize Amer-
ica- I point the finger in their face and say 'you helped make this happen."'). 
298. Robertson, who had agreed with Falwell, claimed not to have grasped what his 
colleague had said. Falwell, in turn, apologized. John F. Harris, Falwell Apologizes for 
Remarks, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at C4. 
299. GEOFFREY LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE 2, 243,296 (2001). 
300. Amy Sullivan, Do Democrats Have a Prayer? WASH. MONTHLY, June 2003, at 
30, 35. 
301. Charles Krauthammer, The Church-State Debate, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 
17-24,1984,at16. 
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Before Reagan, prayer in schools was either a nonpartisan 
issue or an intramural squabble among Republicans. John Dan-
forth, an Episcopalian (one of the so-called mainstream Protes-
tant demoninations that believe in a high wall of separation) 
stated that "the debate on school prayer is not between the 
godly and the ungodly."302 As the Reagan revolution brought 
evangelicals in and pushed liberal Republicans out, prayer took 
on a more partisan cast. Yet the usual Democratic response re-
mained the same.303 
Reagan's victory confirmed that the evangelicals had the of-
fense, and after Justice O'Connor joined the Court, the cases 
sustaining the nativity scene, the chaplain, and some parochial 
school aid fused to inspire the title of an Anti-Defamation 
League book a few years later: Lowering the Wall. 304 There had 
to be a Democratic response. A tactical response in the debate 
over a constitutional amendment was that prayer in schools was 
already constitutionally available-so lonfo as it was silent-and 
that only silent prayer is truly voluntary.30 
The problems that religion posed for Democrats were real. 
Why was evangelical participation bad, but participation by Af-
rican-American ministers good? Why did Catholics err in politi-
cizing abortion but not the nuclear freeze? What if the Regubli-
cans' position on prayer was as popular as polls suggested? 6 
The Democratic position, opposing what evangelicals 
wanted as matters of both politics and principle, was clear. Im-
plementing it was less so. With the exception of African-
Americans, Democrats believed in Jefferson's wall of separation. 
Just as the Burger Court had lowered the wall in the mid-1980s, 
so too did the Rehnquist Court adopt an accommodationist 
stance,307 with the exception of prayer at school functions.308 
Nevertheless, while the Court sustained a voucher program in 
Cleveland,309 it drew a line at the attempt to require states to 
302. 130 CONG. REC. 4580 (1984). 
303. Krauthammer, supra note 301, at 16. 
304. See GREGG IVERS, LOWERING THE WALL (1991). 
305. Senator Howard Metzenbaum made both points. 130 CONG. REC. 5835 (1984). 
306. Prayer in the public schools consistently received 70 percent support, and Strom 
Thurmond asserted 80 percent during the debates. 130 CONG. REC. 4319 (1984). 
307. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cen-
tral School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) Regardless how one wishes to characterize City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we believe it is best understood in terms of the Court's vi-
sion of its own role in the constitutional order. 
308. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. V. Doe, 530 
u.s. 290 (2000). 
309. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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treat religious institutions equally with secular ones in funding 
programs?10 
The issue of religious accommodation was so touchy that 
not once did a Democratic platform even mention prayer (vol-
untary or otherwise). Normally Democrats relied on surrogates 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United 
for the Separation of Church and State, the Anti-Defamation 
League, and the newly created People for the American Way, to 
decry the weakening wall. Nevertheless, during the 1984 cam-
paign, Walter Mondale joined the issue directly when conserva-
tive columnist Fred Barnes asked Mondale during the first de-
bate if he considered himself "a born again Christian" and how 
his religious beliefs would "affect" his decisions as president.311 
As to the first, Mondale replied: "I don't know if I have been 
born again, but I know I was born into a Christian family." 312 In-
stead of Jefferson's wa113 Mondale referred to a "line" that should never be crossed.31 
Barnes then asked whether Mondale objected only to con-
servative ministers in politics. Mondale's wandering response 
eventually settled on opposition to imposing one's religious 
views on others: "that's where I draw the line." A better follow-
up by Barbara Walters elicited a condemnation of school prayer 
and praise for the Senate's rejection of a prayer amendment 
"because it will undermine the practice of honest faith in our 
country by politicizing it."314 
Bill Clinton's ease with religion and religious language plus 
the Republican emphasis on vouchers, which implicated both 
public schools and teachers' unions, left the religion issue quies-
cent during his presidency. During the 2000 campaign, Democ-
ratic vice-presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman made De-
mocrats uneasy because he was unapologetic about the role of 
religion in his life. "[O]nce I opened my mouth and actually pro-
fessed my faith, to give glory and thanks to God for the extraor-
dinary opportunit~ I had been given, those Hosannas turned to 
'How dare he's"'. 15 Indeed, he and Republican Rick Santorum 
cosponsored one of the first bills from the Bush faith-based ini-
310. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) 
311. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC llOB (1984). 
312. /d. 
313. /d. 
314. /d. at 111B. 
315. John B. Judis & Ruy Teixeira, Majority Rules, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5 & 
12, 2002, at 19. 
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tiative-a bill that provided more tax incentives for charitable 
contributions. 
The Bush program placed Democrats in a politically diffi-
cult position. They did not want to be seen as anti-religion, nor 
did they want to be in a position of opposing anything that 
helped social programs. Bush, or probably more correctly, John 
Diiulio, the head of the new office, astutely added to Democrats' 
discomfort by gaining the support of some prominent African-
American ministers and leaders. But the lightning rod on relig-
ion arose with the initiatives that came to be known as "charita-
ble choice." In essence, religious charities could receive govern-
ment money to do social work beyond current arrangements. 
The first point of contention was the extent and methods of 
separating religion from social work. The idea that federal 
money could be used to proselytize made even some Republi-
cans nervous. The Democrats let the Republicans engage in in-
tramural infighting while staying silent themselves although 
eventually Republicans in the House crafted something that they 
could support. 
When the proposals finally had a congressional hearing, 
Democrats expressed their latent unease. Happily for them, they 
were handed a politically acceptable way to oppose the effort by, 
of all groups, the Salvation Army. An internal Salvation Army 
document was leaked, claiming that the White House had prom-
ised to issue a regulation exempting religious groups from state 
and local laws that ban discrimination against gays in hiring and 
domestic partner benefits.316 The Democrats' opposition could 
now be cast as an issue of protecting existing nondiscrimination 
policies. As the New York Times reported, "the overarching fear 
among the Democratic lawmakers was that this effort to im-
prove social services was a needless assault on hard-won civil 
rights and the separation of church and state. "317 Or as Senate 
Democratic leader Tom Daschle put it, "Some of the provisions 
in the bill would allow an exemption [from] the civil rights laws 
of this country for organizations who are the beneficiaries of this 
new program. That concerns me a great deal. Rolling back the 
mandates and the guidelines that we have with regard to toler-
ance in this country is unacceptable ... and I think that the Sen-
ate will take a very critical view of those provisions of the bill."318 
316. CONG. Q. WEEKLY, July 14,2001. 
317. Elizabeth Becker, Bush's Plan to Aid Religious Groups Is Faulted, N.Y. nMES, 
April27, 2001, at A17. 
318. David Boyer, Bush Prods Senate on Faith-Based Bills, WASH. nMES, July 21, 
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As it turned out, the Senate did not have to decide. By the time 
the House bill emerged, it had lost much of its glow of biparti-
sanship as the vote proceeded largely upon party lines. Then 
September 11 caused (or allowed) the President to change pri-
orities and attempt to implement his program administratively. 
Whatever unease Democrats felt, they nevertheless have re-
mained silent. 
F. SUMMING UP THE PARTIES' VISIONS 
Because the two parties' constitutions have been in place 
for so long, they not only look forward; they also look backward. 
They look forward, of course, because if either party achieves 
electoral success, it can hope to do better than the Republicans 
under Reagan and the first Bush and in fact place a majority of 
true believers on the Court. Then, the natural assumption is, the 
new majority will implement the victorious party's constitutional 
vision. Whether it will work that way in reality is never certain. 
There are reasons to believe that it will not happen. 
More fundamentally, the parties' constitutional visions look 
backward because the issues were framed by the Warren and 
early Burger Courts. The two parties' constitutions bracket the 
Warren Court, with the Republicans retreating almost fifty years 
and the Democrats about thirty. Both parties build on the War-
ren Court legacy of forcing the South (and other outliers) to con-
form to the values of national elites.319 Because the Warren 
Court prevailed against the outliers, current constitutional bat-
tles are political, not geographical. Thus, by ending the largely 
sectional nature of constitutional disputes, the Warren Court 
laid the groundwork for constitutional issues to return to the ear-
lier fault lines of political battles, such as those over slaverl20 
and economic regulation. But as we have repeated, there now is 
a difference because neither party claims the Court's position. 
The Republicans have frozen their constitution at Brown. It 
is the bygone world of small-town America, with the decided 
improvement that racial discrimination is prohibited. Religion 
can be a part of the schools, abortion may be criminalized, and 
police practices are largely invisible to judicial scrutiny. Courts 
know their subordinate place and stay there, though activism 
may be required to get back to the right status quo. 
2001, at Al 
319. POWE, supra note 51, at 489-94. 
320. Recall that Northern Democrats supported the continuation of slavery. 
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By contrast, the rights-oriented Democratic position re-
quires a return to the Warren Court and a judiciary actively will-
ing to place certain values into the Constitution because that is 
what right-thinking people would have in a good constitution. 
Democrats look to a Court with the immodesty of Antonin 
Scalia and the jurisprudence of William J. Brennan. The "Great 
Court" is then coupled with an unacknowledged321 hostility to 
elections. Whatever their rhetoric about facilitating voting and 
voters, Democrats are unwilling to let elections decide the fed-
eral or state policies on affirmative action, criminal justice, abor-
tion, and religion. 
IV. THE THIRD WAY 
At least compared to the Republican and the Democratic 
visions, the Court's doctrines look like bipartisanship personi-
fied. The Warren Court's legendary criminal procedure decisions 
still stand, but not for all they were worth. Affirmative action has 
been tamed rather than eliminated (or left to run riot). Women 
retain their right to an abortion, but the public need not fund it, 
and children need parents. State sponsored prayer is unconstitu-
tional, but it has been almost a generation since the last funding 
program was struck down on establishment clause grounds. Not 
all the Court's positions have been popular, but its middle 
ground may approximate public attitudes better than either of 
the two parties. 
If we are correct that the Court has offered a third constitu-
tional vision not in sync with either party's and that it is a new 
phenomenon, what is happening? There are many possible ex-
planations, and they are not mutually exclusive. But first, a ques-
tion arises with our analysis. Have we seen a third vision enunci-
ated by the Court, or have we simply seen a swing vote prevail in 
what otherwise were positions mimicking those of the political 
parties? 
There are, of course, factions on the Court that agree with 
the Republican and Democratic positions. What is crucial, how-
ever, is that even if the original third vision began as a compro-
mise, it has taken hold. This has occurred by Justices on the 
Court coming to embrace the third vision, and it has occurred by 
321. But not unrecognized. See TuSHNET, supra note 8, at 177-81; RICHARD POSNER, 
BRE";KING TilE DEADLOCK 179 (2001); see also id. at 142 ("Judicial liberalism has long 
s1grufied a distrust of democratic process."). 
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attrition. Sitting Justices are free to ignore the parties' constitu-
tional visions, but a nominee going through the confirmation 
process is not so fortunate. A nominee will be acutely aware of 
parties' positions because they will inform the Senators' ques-
tioning. Indeed, new Justices often must be committed to the 
"compromise" in order to make it through the political process. 
As long as there is divided government or a closely divided Sen-
ate, we are likely to see replacements favoring-or at least 
nominally committed to continuing-the third way. What was 
once a compromise or simply the opinion of the swing Justice 
thus becomes the status quo. Depending upon one's belief about 
the effect of precedent on Justices, the third way may persist 
even with a shift to a less divided government. Whether it is a 
commitment to stare decisis or a new preferred outcome is be-
side the point. The third way holds. 
The three-vision world is an unprecedented phenomenon. 
Why has it occurred? We have just offered two explanations: re-
cruitment and stare decisis. Another issue involving recruitment 
suggests a more systemic change. Justices the past quarter-
century have spent their primary careers as jurists with little or 
no time in the political vineyards. It was not always so. Justices 
who came to the Supreme Court from careers as Senators, gov-
ernors, SEC chairmen, or close friends of the President did not 
always simply adopt the positions of their parties when they 
moved to the Court. However, their deep involvement in politics 
and political parties, often as leaders who helped shape the vi-
sions of their parties, surely made them more in sync with the 
constitutional vision of their parties. 
Distinctions among Justices may be even more subtle than 
whether or not they come to the Court as jurists or politicians. 
Over the past twenty years, two types of Supreme Court Justices 
have been appointed. The first are those who took seats on the 
courts of appeals as a natural stepping stone to the Supreme 
Court. With that goal in mind, they strove to be visible to the 
important constituency groups within their party, and they car-
ried out lobbying campaigns (with varying degrees of subtlety) 
to achieve their goal. Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg (not to men-
tion Bork) fall within this category. Not surprisingly, their judi-
cial positions mirror those of their party. 
The second type are those who went to the bench without 
the slightest expectation of ever reaching the Supreme Court. 
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For them-O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-the nomination 
was just as fluky as if they had been hit by lightning.322 Since they 
never expected to reach the Supreme Court, they had neither 
lobbied for the job nor attached themselves firmly to the ideol-
ogy of their party. 
Whatever their past, judges who are promoted to the Su-
preme Court generally have needed to disassociate themselves 
with their parties. Partisanship may well have put them on the 
bench in the first place, but after their initial appointment, their 
party ties had to be benched. Indeed, actions on their part that 
differed from their party's perceived position are often used sub-
sequently as testimony to their independence. This is not to say 
that career judges are nonideological, but that the things that 
shape their ideology may differ from those whose ideology has 
been shaped in the crucible of politics. So, while on many issues 
the third way may be solely a function of vote aggregation on a 
closely divided Court, it is also the case that even the more ideo-
logical Justices will differ with their parties. The views of Justice 
Scalia on the First Amendment would have a hard time making 
it into the Republican platform, sexually related matters ex-
cluded, as might the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on the 
Fourth Amendment. Justices differing with their parties is noth-
ing new, but the practice of recruiting Justices from the rank of 
judges may increase the tendency toward a third way. 
Another explanation may involve the judicialization and le-
galization of politics. Even though the inordinate influence of 
the judiciary on a democratic polity traces its origins to the very 
beginning of the republic, few would doubt the ever-growing na-
ture of issues that have become legalized. Increased legalization 
often involves constitutionalization of issues. At the least, consti-
tutional issues hover overhead. Political decisions are increas-
ingly perceived as penultimate, often awaiting a court's blessing 
or rejection. Over the past thirty years, Tocqueville's famous ob-
servation that political issues become legal ones has become 
even more descriptive.323 That said, the activist Warren Court 
rarely struck down federal statutes and never invalidated a live, 
important federal statute.324 Some have argued that politicians 
322. O'Connor described her appointment in exactly this term. SANDRA DAy 
O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF LAW xii (2003). 
. 323. Of course, as Mark Graber demonstrates, Tocqueville's observation was wholly 
mcorrect when made. Mark Graber, Resolving Political Questions Into Judicial Ques-
tions: Tocqueville's Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485 (2004). 
324. See L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of Judicial Review, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
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now are willing to make decisions with little rigorous constitu-
tional thinking because it is up to the courts to determine consti-
tutionality. That is not to say that politicians are indifferent to 
constitutionality or do not opine about the Constitution, but that 
they do not attend to constitutional issues in the same wals 
knowing that a court will ultimately decide constitutionality.3 5 
In such an environment it may not be so surprising that the Jus-
tices are carving their own way. 
In addition to lawmakers and others seeing judicial deci-
sions at all levels as the final step in policymaking, the Justices 
often seem to believe that about themselves on many of the most 
important and contentious issues.326 Though Justices can avoid 
tackling an issue by denying cert., "digging" a case after they get 
it, or sidestepping an issue even if they reach the merits, they 
seem to be less and less willing to do so for major issues.327 De-
spite some speculation to the contrary, there was no way that the 
Supreme Court was going to avoid taking Bush v. Gore. Not 
only did political actors seek the Court's involvement, the Court 
itself believed its intervention was necessary.328 The ideas of a 
robust political question doctrine329 or "passive virtues"330 seem 
almost quaint; indeed in many quarters they are seen as irre-
sponsible. As the parties have diverged in their understanding of 
the Constitution and Justices of all ideological stripes have be-
come more activist, it is not surprising that more constitutional 
visions have emerged. 
Not only do more issues find their way into courts, when 
they reach the Court's agenda, with some exceptions, they get 
decided. Constitutional law is made. Parties and legislatures, on 
the other hand, have a very different decisional calculus. Parties 
have the ability to expound their constitutional ideas without 
ever really reaching a concrete decision. So too with legislatures 
as the parties in government. Most issues never make the 
697,721 (2003). 
325. Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit, 51 DUKE L.J. 435,440-54 (2001) 
326. See Powe, supra note 324, at 730-31; H.W.PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: 
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991). 
32 7. See PERRY, supra note 326. 
328. It would be interesting to learn the cert. vote. It is possible that several Justices 
engaged in defensive denials, see id. at 198-212, but we suspect that most felt that they 
had to take the case even if they felt that the decision should be made elsewhere. 
329. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002) 
330. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, 
]., concurring); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
2004] POLITICAL BATTLE FOR CONSTITUTION 693 
agenda, let alone become law.331 A minority has extraordinary 
veto powers, and special interest groups on the right and left 
wield this power with great effect. When an issue does become 
law, it is almost always the product of compromise. The constitu-
tional vision of a party rarely gets voted on. The point is that the 
decision processes of courts and legislatures differ. With in-
creased decisional responsibility moving to the Supreme Court, 
we might expect to see a new phenomenon emerge, such as a 
persisting third way, that heretofore had not existed. 
Though these structural issues such as recruitment patterns 
and locus of decisions may help explain three visions rather than 
two, they do not compel the phenomenon. For that, we return to 
where we began, the need to focus on parties to understand the 
outputs of governing regimes. 
Whether or not one agrees with our evaluation of changes 
in the Court and among the Justices, there has been an un-
doubted change in our two national political parties, at least as it 
relates to the parties in government. By almost any measure, the 
two national political parties are more ideologically cohesive, 
and they have become more polarized. We have documented the 
differences on some major constitutional issues, but it is true 
over a wide range of issues.332 We have noted the increase in 
party cohesion scores within both of the houses and in presiden-
tial support scores. 
With regard to the parties in the electorate, there has been 
change as well, though characterizing the change is a bit more 
complicated than we can elaborate here.333 Generally speaking, 
the parties are more "extreme" in their positions and more po-
larized. There is little ideological overlap. This is explained in 
large part by the disappearance of conservative Southern De-
mocrats and liberal Republicans. Equally important, however, is 
where the power centers now lie in the Congress. Southern De-
mocrats not only made the party more conservative, given the 
331. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 
(1984). 
332. See STEPEHNSON, surpa note 1. 
333. The data on the electorate are less clear. There is an extensive debate over 
whether there has been a partisan realignment in the electorate. The debate includes the 
definition of a realignment. Paradigmatically, a partisan realignment occurs when the the 
minority party becomes the majority party. See WALTER D. BURNHAM, CRITICAL 
ELECTIONS: THE MAINSPRING OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1971). Whatever the outcome 
of the realignment debate, change has occurred. Many Southern Democrats have 
switched parties, and the strength of Republicans in the South can also be explained by 
replacement. 
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seniority system they also wielded a huge amount of power. No 
longer. In both parties, the safe districts that lead to seniority 
tend to be at the extremes. Regardless of the increasing polariza-
tion of the parties' presidential wings as reflected in the plat-
forms the past structure of congressional power mitigated the 
output. That is less true today. Ironically, as the politics of Con-
gress becomes more ideologically extreme, ideological non-
centrist jurists are less likely to survive a congressional vetting. 
More to the point, Justices have been and will be less likely to 
defer to congressional understandings of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
What we have described is one answer to Larry Kramer's 
lament in We the Courf34 as well as a way of clarifying what 
Charles Fried finds "perplexing" in Five to Four.335 Even though 
Kramer is right on target with his explanation of the Rehnquist 
majority's judicial imperialism, he was not describing a Court 
that has vanquished the field from constitutional politics. It may 
well be that "[t]he idea of constitutional politics outside the 
amendment process is, to the Rehnguist Court, a threatening 
and possibly oxymoronic proposal"336 just as once the idea that 
the earth moves was anathema to the Pope. The Court may wish 
to preempt constitutional politics, but it cannot. Thus Casey's 
diktat that Americans should abandon their fights over abortion 
had the same effect on the abortion debate that the Pope's anti-
Copernican conclusion had on the earth's movement around the 
sun. There is and has been for over thirty years a robust debate 
outside the Court on the meanings of the Constitution. That de-
bate has been driven by politics and therefore is impossible to 
halt. 
Fried claims "we cannot map the split [on the Court] into a 
coherent political vision."337 We have. The split between those 
who auditioned for the Court and those who didn't represents 
334. Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, October Term 2000 Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
335. Charles Fried, The Supreme Coun, October Term 2001 Foreword· Five to Four, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 195 (2002). 
336. Kramer, supra note 334, at 160; accord Laurence Tribe, Bush v. Gore and its 
Disguises, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 290 (2001) ("[T]he Justices in the Bush v. Gore major-
ity have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner in the constitutional enter-
prise, and not much patience with 'We the People' as the ultimate sources of sovereignty 
in this republic."). 
337. Fried, supra note 335, at 1%. 
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the split between advocates of the Republican and Democratic 
constitutions and those going a third way. Moreover, apart from 
that split, it may be that neither the Republican nor the Democ-
ratic constitutional vision is sufficiently coherent for Fried. As 
we have shown, however, politics created those visions, and the 
parties have found them sufficiently coherent to last for decades. 
Even if we are mistaken about causes and predictions, we 
have nevertheless documented a two-way split between the par-
ties on a number of major constitutional issues and described a 
very active debate against a background of an imperial Court. 
Furthermore, we have demonstrated the way that political needs 
create constitutional visions that, in turn, escalate the intensity of 
the debate. This has occurred twice before in American history, 
with the intense debates over slavery and economic regulation. 
Both times the result was a complete victory for one of the par-
ties. 
We have documented what we think is a different, interest-
ing, and important phenomenon over the past thirty years. We 
also think, however, it provides a template for looking into the 
future. Divided government has been a recent staple in Ameri-
can politics. Though the government has not always remained 
divided as some predicted, the margins have been close enough 
so that neither party is dominating the national political process. 
Though much has been made of the effect of divided govern-
ment on policy, we have linked it to outcomes on the Supreme 
Court. Partisan division may not affect an individual Justice's 
decisions, but what it may do is give us Souters, Kennedys, and 
the like, who may reinforce third-way approaches offered by Jus-
tices such as O'Connor. 
The debates over the confirmation of John Roberts and 
Samuel Alito demonstrate that at least three of the four issues 
we highlighted-abortion, religion, and race-remain contested. 
As with the Clinton presidency, the Democrats appear unwilling 
to challenge the Court on criminal procedure issues, although we 
suspect they would like to. It also is interesting to see what issues 
may take a third path in the future. Arguably, this has occurred 
with federalism, although like presidential power, it is hard to 
separate theoretical positions of the parties from immediate pol-
icy interests. For example, Republicans rarely seem to mind fed-
erally controlled crime policies despite their general argument to 
return power to the states. Democrats rarely call for more power 
to Washingto'l as a theoretical matter, though there is little 
doubt about the difference between the parties on the general 
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role of states versus the federal government. We may however 
hear the virtues of states as laboratories for experimentation 
when it comes to gay marriage. The Democrats' opposition to 
the Court has largely focused on the specific issue-guns near 
schools, protection for violence against women, protection of the 
environment-rather than the issue of federalism per se. One 
could argue that the Court's federalism jurisprudence is in sync 
with the Republican Party, but one might equally argue that it 
has started down a third road. An argument could be made that 
a third way is beginning to occur with capital punishment, and 
maybe the same is true with regard to gay rights. One can even 
imagine it occurring over issues of property rights and gun con-
trol. Whatever the Court does, however, it will be accompanied 
by a full debate between the parties over what the Constitution 
"really" means. 
